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INTRODUCTION 
When the United States Supreme Court validated the limited use of 
race as an admissions criterion in Grutter v. Bollinger eight years ago,1 
many veterans of the civil rights struggle greeted the decision with elation.  
Elaine R. Jones, then-President of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, Inc., called the decision upholding the University of Michi-
gan’s law school admissions program “a slam-dunk victory affirming the 




*  Assistant Professor, University of Texas School of Law.  I received particularly helpful feedback 
on earlier drafts from the following people: Katharine Bartlett, Oren Bracha, Dorothy Brown, Sherry 
Colb, Rosalind Dixon, Karen Engle, Laura Ferry, William Forbath, Jacob Gersen, Pratheepan Gulaseka-
ram, Christopher Hsu, Amy Kapczynski, Randall Kennedy, Sanford Levinson, Wendy Parker, Scot 
Powe, David Rabban, Lawrence Sager, Gregory Shaffer, Suzanna Sherry, Jordan Steiker, and Patrick 
Woolley.  In addition, I received many thoughtful questions from participants in the faculty workshops 
at the following law schools: Boston College, Chicago, Colorado, Duke, Emory, Fordham, Georgia, 
Georgetown, Minnesota, North Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington University in St. Louis.  
Charles Mackel and Mark Wiles provided stellar research assistance.   
1  539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
2  Lynette Clemetson, NAACP Legal Defense Fund Chief Retires, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004, at A10.  
In announcing her departure from an organization for which she had worked for thirty-two years, Jones 
cited the positive result in Grutter as enabling her to retire with a clear conscience: “After that I knew I 
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Jones’s predecessors at the Legal Defense Fund and part of the litigation 
team who won Brown v. Board of Education,3 also viewed Grutter as an af-
firmation of the organization’s efforts to achieve black advancement.4  Pro-
fessor Greenberg expressed particular admiration for Grutter’s conception 
of affirmative action not as a policy that benefits primarily blacks but in-
stead as a policy that benefits all of American society—including the armed 
services and the business communities.5  Referring to Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion for the Court in Grutter, Professor Greenberg commented that she 
kept “[h]er eye . . . on the condition of society and what affirmative action 
can do to help fix it, not what caused the condition.”6  This holistic perspec-
tive was, in Professor Greenberg’s estimation, deeply commendable.7  “In 
this I think she is not only right,” Professor Greenberg wrote, “but it is what 
has been the driving force of affirmative action all the time: affirmative ac-
tion to make ours a better country.”8 
Grutter was not, of course, praised in all circles.  In addition to criti-
cism launched at the opinion from the right for its refusal to prohibit racial 
classifications,9 legal scholars on the left also criticized Grutter for precise-
ly the feature that Professor Greenberg lauded: its justification of affirma-
tive action as a compelling government interest on the ground that such 
programs enhance leading American institutions rather than on the ground 
that such programs benefit racial minorities.   
Most prominently, Professor Derrick Bell viewed Grutter as a “defini-
tive example” of his “interest-convergence” thesis.10  According to this the-
                                                                                                                 
could go.”  Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).  Professor Lani Guinier invoked precisely the same 
basketball metaphor as Jones did to describe the complete nature of the Grutter victory.  See Lani Guini-
er, The Constitution Is Both Colorblind and Color-Conscious, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 4, 2003, at 
B11 (“The Supreme Court’s decision was a slam-dunk victory for affirmative action.”). 
3  347 U.S. 483, 484 (1954). 
4  See Jack Greenberg, Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1610 
(2003).  For an argument viewing Grutter as a reaffirmation of Brown, see Harry T. Edwards, The Jour-
ney from Brown v. Board of Education to Grutter v. Bollinger: From Racial Assimilation to Diversity, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 944, 946 (2004): “Through the ideal of diversity, Grutter reaffirmed Brown’s com-
mitment to racial equality.” 
5  Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1618–19 (noting that Grutter conceptualized “affirmative action for 
what it does for society as a whole”).  As is well known, Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court in 
Grutter validated the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action policy, in part, by citing 
amicus briefs from retired military officers and Fortune 500 companies.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330–31.   
6  Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1621.   
7  See id. 
8  Id.  For a similar analysis that preceded Grutter, see Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher 
Education: Confronting the Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 522–25 (2002).   
9  See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Grutter and Gratz: Race Preference to Increase Racial Representation 
Held “Patently Unconstitutional” Unless Done Subtly Enough in the Name of Pursuing “Diversity,” 
78 TUL. L. REV. 2037, 2048 (2004). 
10  Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1624 (2003) [hereinafter Bell, 
Diversity’s Distractions]; see also DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 149 (2004) [hereinafter BELL, SILENT 
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sis, blacks receive favorable judicial decisions to the extent that their inter-
ests coincide with the interests of whites.11  The Court’s decision in Brown, 
by these lights, was not motivated by a desire to redress black suffering un-
der racial segregation; instead, the United States eliminated Jim Crow in 
order to improve its international image during the Cold War.12  Writing 
nearly five decades after Brown was decided, Professor Bell detected simi-
lar motivations animating the Court’s decision in Grutter: “When [Justice 
O’Connor] perceived in the Michigan Law School’s admissions program an 
affirmative action plan that minimizes the importance of race while offering 
maximum protection to whites and those aspects of society with which she 
identifies, she supported it.”13  Professor Bell contended that Grutter 
“should provide [him] with some measure of a prophet’s pride” because he 
has long asserted “that no matter how much harm blacks were suffering be-
cause of racial hostility and discrimination, we could not obtain meaningful 
relief until policymakers perceived that the relief blacks sought furthered 
interests or resolved issues of more primary concern.”14  Just as Brown did 
not immediately lead to desegregated schools in much of the country,15 Pro-
fessor Bell predicted that Grutter would prove to be a fleeting victory for 
                                                                                                                 
COVENANTS] (referring to Grutter as a “prime example” of the interest-convergence thesis).  Professor 
Bell referred to “interest convergence” as a “dilemma” in his 1980 Harvard Law Review article.  Derrick 
A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
518 (1980) [hereinafter Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma].  Throughout this Article, however, I gen-
erally use the terms “thesis” and “theory” interchangeably.  I do so for two different reasons.  First, Pro-
fessor Bell uses these terms in his subsequent scholarship.  Second, the terms are—to my ears, at least—
less loaded than the term “dilemma.” 
11  Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10. 
12  See id.  After Professor Bell observed the Cold War implications of Brown, Professor Mary Dud-
ziak discovered extensive documentation that was designed to underscore how anti-Communist con-
cerns played an important role in motivating the U.S. government to advocate racial desegregation.  See 
Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 66 (1988) (“I con-
clude by suggesting that this article demonstrates Derrick Bell’s interest-convergence thesis: The con-
sensus against racial segregation in the 1950s resulted from a convergence of interests on the part of 
whites and persons of color.”).  There is no question that anti-Communist sentiment exerted some influ-
ence in motivating the Solicitor General’s office, among other offices within the U.S. government, to 
oppose racial segregation.  See id. at 62–63.  As Professor Curtis Bradley has noted, however, it is also 
possible that the role of anti-Communism in motivating the government to end desegregation has been 
overstated.  See Curtis A. Bradley, Foreign Affairs and Domestic Reform, 87 VA. L. REV. 1475, 1476 
(2001) (“[T]o say that Cold War foreign affairs played a role in U.S. civil rights reform does not tell us 
much about its relative influence as compared with other influences, a difficult if not impossible empiri-
cal question.  Even in light of the substantial evidence that Professor Dudziak presents suggesting that 
U.S. government officials linked race relations to Cold War politics, one still might conclude that the 
influence of the Cold War concerns on civil rights reform was relatively minor when compared with 
other, domestic influences.”).   
13  BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 151 (“Diversity in the classroom, the work floor, 
and the military, not the need to address past and continuing racial barriers, gained her vote.”). 
14  Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, supra note 10, at 1624.   
15  See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 344–63 (2004); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN 
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 52 (2d ed. 2008). 
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racial minorities: “Once again, blacks and Hispanics are the fortuitous bene-
ficiaries of a ruling that can and probably will change when other priorities 
assert themselves.”16 
Professor Bell was far from alone in viewing Grutter as evidence of 
the interest-convergence theory at work.  Indeed, a strikingly large number 
of scholars independently identified the Court’s decision as a vivid illustra-
tion of racial interests converging.17  Grutter thus provides a clear view of 
the central position that the interest-convergence theory occupies in consti-
tutional law scholarship in general and race relations law in particular.  
Even though Professor Bell introduced the theory more than thirty years 
ago, many scholars who explore how race interacts with the law continue to 




16  BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 151.  
17  See Michelle Adams, Shifting Sands: The Jurisprudence of Integration Past, Present, and Future, 
47 HOW. L.J. 795, 827 (2004) (“[W]e have come full circle to the ‘interest-convergence’ idea articulated 
by Derrick Bell a generation ago.”); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The 
Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1484 (2005) (“The predominant line of reasoning 
running through the Michigan opinion remained that affirmative action furthers the interests of whites as 
a group, even if such programs sometimes deny individual whites access to certain selective institutions 
of higher education.  In other words, the interests of the majority converged with the interests of the mi-
nority, and it is this convergence that justified programs that otherwise would be deemed unlawful.”); 
Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law and the New Signi-
ficance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 678 (2004) (“Perhaps [Grutter] is just another ex-
ample of what Derrick Bell has called ‘interest-convergence’—that civil rights progress occurs only in 
moments when it benefits white elites, whether for economic profit or national security.  Just as Brown 
v. Board of Education’s historic prohibition of segregation came in a context of the United States mili-
tary promoting diversity on behalf of national security, here again in the wake of terrorist attacks—a 
new national crisis—the Court appears to be paying attention to the views of retired military leaders and 
powerful business forces that claim affirmative action protects their interests.” (footnote omitted)); Ste-
ven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags in America’s 
Boardrooms and What to Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1612–13 (2004) (“This alignment 
of interests was achieved in the Grutter opinion fifty years [after Brown], where it succeeded in securing 
qualified support for affirmative action from a fundamentally conservative Court.”); Daria Roithmayr, 
Tacking Left: A Radical Critique of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 213 (2004) (“Derrick Bell 
writes that material gains come to communities of color only when those gains serve white interests.  
Grutter demonstrates Bell’s point.” (footnote omitted)). 
18  Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and Ideology Through Inter-
est Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253, 271 n.67 (2005).  See also Richard Delgado, Two Ways to 
Think About Race: Reflections on the Id, the Ego, and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 
89 GEO. L.J. 2279, 2284 (2001) [hereinafter Delgado, Two Ways] (describing Interest-Convergence Di-
lemma as a “classic article”); Dudziak, supra note 12, at 64 (deeming Interest-Convergence Dilemma 
“important and suggestive”); Neil Gotanda, Towards Repeal of Asian Exclusion, in ASIAN AMERICANS 
AND CONGRESS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 309, 313 (Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1996) (labeling the theory 
an “influential suggestion”); Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board 
of Education and the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. AM. HIST. 92, 94 (2004) (describing Interest-
Convergence Dilemma as an “influential article”); David A. Singleton, Interest Convergence and the 
Education of African-American Boys in Cincinnati: Motivating Suburban Whites to Embrace Interdi-
strict Education Reform, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 663, 671 (2007) (deeming the work an “influential article”); 
Alexander Tsesis, Justice at War and Brown v. Board of Education, 47 HOW. L.J. 361, 367 (2004) 
(labeling the work an “influential article”); Book Note, Brown’s Potential, Still Unrealized, 115 HARV. 
105:149  (2011) Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis 
 153
that has supported Professor Bell’s assertion regarding the primacy of the 
Cold War in achieving desegregation,19 the interest-convergence thesis has 
become a part of the standard account of the Court’s motivations for 
Brown.20  Scholars particularly concerned with the plight of blacks, fur-
thermore, continue to find vitality in the interest-convergence thesis.21  In 
addition, scholars have applied the interest-convergence theory to explain 
legal developments among nonblack racial groups, including Latinos22 and 
Asian-Americans.23   
                                                                                                                 
L. REV. 2034, 2036 n.22 (2002) (reviewing WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE 
SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 
(Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (contending that the theory offers “compelling analyses of the Court’s moti-
vations for outlawing segregation”)). 
The Interest-Convergence Dilemma played a significant role in establishing Professor Bell as the 
most prominent black law professor of his era.  See Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Toolkit—Fit to 
Dismantle that Famous House?, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 284 (2000) (listing the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma first among the “treasure trove of ideas [that] Derrick Bell has showered on an entire genera-
tion of his readers!”).  For testaments to Professor Bell’s prominence, see Richard Delgado, Enormous 
Anomaly?: Left-Right Parallels in Recent Writing About Race, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1547, 1550 (1991) 
(reviewing DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) 
[hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]) (“Derrick Bell is perhaps the country’s leading African-
American legal scholar.”); Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1745, 1786 (1989) (“Derrick Bell is the most widely-known black legal academic in the coun-
try . . . .”).  Not every commentator was convinced that Professor Bell’s scholarship warranted its pree-
minence.  See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Book Review, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 436, 437 (1988) (reviewing 
BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED) (“[T]here can be no sin for which reading Professor Derrick Bell is 
not, for me, adequate punishment.”).     
19  See Dudziak, supra note 12, at 66.   
20  See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Brown v. Board of Education in International Context, 36 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 493, 493 (2005) (“Although the Brown decision did not refer to the international 
stage, there is little doubt that the climate of the era explains, in significant part, why apartheid in Amer-
ica began to unravel after World War II.”); Justice Richard J. Goldstone & Brian Ray, The International 
Legacy of Brown v. Board of Education, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 105, 108 (2004) (“Derrick Bell’s ‘in-
terest convergence’ theory highlights the domestic significance of the prevailing international situation 
for the Brown decision.” (footnote omitted)). 
21  See Cashin, supra note 18, at 254 (contending that the interest-convergence thesis offers “a key 
insight into human nature and American race relations”); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, For Whom Does the 
Bell Toll: The Bell Tolls for Brown?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1510 (2005); john a. powell, The Race 
and Class Nexus: An Intersectional Perspective, 25 LAW & INEQ. 355, 412–13 (2007); Christine H. 
Rossell, The Convergence of Black and White Attitudes on School Desegregation Issues During the 
Four Decade Evolution of the Plans, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613 (1995).  For applications of the in-
terest-convergence theory to the quest for reparations for the enslavement of blacks in the United States, 
see Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts?: Righting the Wrongs of Slavery, 89 GEO. L.J. 2531 
(2001), and Van B. Luong, Note, Political Interest Convergence: African American Reparations and the 
Image of American Democracy, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 253, 263 (2002). 
22  See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roundelay, Hernandez v. Texas and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 23, 63 (2006) (applying interest-convergence to explain the 
Court’s decision prohibiting the exclusion of Mexican-Americans from juries and contending that inter-
est-convergence is a helpful method for understanding “all of Latino history”); María Pabón López, Ref-
lections on Educating Latino and Latina Undocumented Children: Beyond Plyler v. Doe, 35 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1373, 1377 (2005) (“Plyler v. Doe may join Brown v. Board of Education as a decision 
embodying the interest convergence covenants in which educational opportunities for minority students 
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The influence of the interest-convergence theory has extended well 
beyond the borders of race relations law24 as legal academics have imported 
the interest-convergence thesis into a wide array of doctrinal areas.  Consti-
tutional law scholarship, apart from the theory’s implications for Brown, 
has imported the interest-convergence thesis to explain judicial interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment’s religion clauses and the subordination of 
non-Christian religions.25  Criminal law scholarship has imported the inter-
est-convergence thesis to explain why courts sometimes permit “cultural 
defenses” to prevail.26  Employment discrimination law scholarship has im-
ported the interest-convergence thesis to explain when employees will re-
ceive legal relief in challenging employment policies.27  Indian law 
                                                                                                                 
exist only when the students’ interests and the nation’s interests converge.  Analyzing Plyler under an 
interest convergence model demonstrates that the nation’s interest is the maintenance of an underclass of 
undocumented, low-wage earners who fuel the nation’s economy by performing work that is undesirable 
to many United States natives.” (footnotes omitted)).   
23  See, e.g., Rhonda V. Magee, The Master’s Tools, from the Bottom Up: Responses to African-
American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REV. 863, 
908–09 (1993) (contending that the interest-convergence thesis explains why Congress’s favorable re-
sponse to the quest for reparations on behalf of Japanese-Americans for internment coincided with the 
Reagan Administration’s pro-Japan trade policies). 
24  Admittedly, the precise boundaries of “race relations law” are decidedly unclear—perhaps even 
less clear than the boundaries separating other doctrinal areas. 
25  Stephen M. Feldman, Principle, History, and Power: The Limits of the First Amendment Religion 
Clauses, 81 IOWA L. REV. 833, 871–72 (1996) (“Derrick Bell’s interest-convergence thesis helps ex-
plain why the separation of church and state often provides only minimal benefits to outgroup religions, 
such as Judaism: To a great extent, outgroup religions benefit only when their interests happen to con-
verge or correspond with the interests of Christians.  The benefits to outgroups, in other words, are 
merely incidental, while the primary benefits of separation of church and state flow, in fact, to Chris-
tianity, the hegemonically dominant religion in America.”).   
26  See Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the Cultural De-
fense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911, 939 (2007) (“Cultural convergence is the idea that a ‘cultural defense’ is 
more likely to succeed when the cultural norms underlying an immigrant or minority defendant’s cultur-
al defense claim converge with the cultural norms of American society.  Like interest convergence 
theory, cultural convergence theory can be used to explain the underlying forces behind a particular de-
cision or series of decisions. . . .  Cultural convergence, however, focuses on the presence or absence of 
overlapping cultural norms as opposed to converging interests.” (footnotes omitted)). 
27  See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 
112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1764 (2003) (book review) (“With respect to workplace discrimination, the interest 
convergence story holds that the state will require employers to hire nonwhites only when doing so con-
verges with the institutional interests of the employer.  This occurs when diversity hiring provides the 
employer with institutional legitimacy without compromising the efficiency gains attendant to homoge-
neous workplace cultures.”); see also Michael Z. Green, Addressing Race Discrimination Under Title 
VII After Forty Years: The Promise of ADR as Interest-Convergence, 48 HOW. L.J. 937, 940 (2005) (ex-
ploring how alternative dispute resolution “can be used as a mechanism to focus on racial justice in the 
workplace while also acting as a tool to accomplish employer incentives as interest-convergence”); Ra-
mirez, supra note 17 (“[C]onvergence theory holds the promise of real and durable reform in the specif-
ic context of board selection processes and, by extension, in a host of other areas that may be key to ra-
racial progress.”); Joseph C. Feldman, Note, Standing and Delivering on Title VII’s Promises: White 
Employees’ Ability to Sue Employers for Discrimination Against Nonwhites, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 569, 600 (1999) (“For many whites, before they endorse policies that benefit nonwhites and 
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scholarship has imported the interest-convergence thesis to explain why 
state courts give effect to tribal courts’ criminal convictions but not to tribal 
courts’ civil judgments.28 
Alongside these examples of the theory’s application to assorted doc-
trinal areas, many scholars have looked to it as providing a strategic method 
for producing social and political change.  Among the extremely broad 
range of issues that scholars believe the interest-convergence theory can 
remedy or illuminate are the following: educational reform,29 pension 
reform,30 animal rights,31 domestic violence,32 concentrated poverty,33 and 
even the war on terror.34  The interest-convergence theory’s strategic impli-
cations have also been adopted by the popular press,35 and the theory has 
been cited approvingly in federal judicial decisions.36   
                                                                                                                 
make the possibility of Title VII suits a real deterrent to employers who would discriminate, they must 
believe that their own self-interests are furthered.”). 
28  See Kevin K. Washburn, A Different Kind of Symmetry, 34 N.M. L. REV. 263, 286–87 (2004) 
(contending that while “certain states are willing to credit tribal court convictions because it serves the 
public safety interests of the non-Indian majority . . . the recognition of tribal civil judgments serves no 
such interest and, thus, under Professor Bell’s theory, the non-Indian majority is less willing to respect 
such judgments” (footnote omitted)).  For additional examples of the interest-convergence theory’s ap-
plication to other doctrinal fields, see, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immi-
gration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 283–84 
(1996) (applying the insights of interest convergence to immigration law). These examples of interest-
convergence importation present merely an illustrative rather than an exhaustive list. 
29  See, e.g., Bryan L. Adamson, The H’aint in the (School) House: The Interest Convergence Para-
digm in State Legislatures and School Finance Reform, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 173 (2006); Singleton, su-
pra note 18. 
30  See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions, Risk, and Race, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1505 
(2004) (“[B]ecause employer sponsored pension plans exclude a majority of Whites and people of color, 
according to Professor Derrick Bell’s interest-convergence thesis, this may be a unique opportunity to 
effectuate pension reform.” (footnote omitted)).  
31  See, e.g., Joseph Lubinski, Note, Screw the Whales, Save Me!: The Endangered Species Act, An-
imal Protection, and Civil Rights, 4 J.L. SOC’Y 377, 411–12 (2003). 
32  See, e.g., Adele M. Morrison, Changing the Domestic Violence (Dis)Course: Moving from White 
Victim to Multi-cultural Survivor, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1061, 1114–18 (2006). 
33  See, e.g., Justin Stec, The Deconcentration of Poverty as an Example of Derrick Bell’s Interest-
Convergence Dilemma: White Neutrality Interests, Prisons, and Changing Inner Cities, 2 NW. J.L. & 
SOC. POL’Y 30 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njlsp/v2/n1/2. 
34  See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice on Trial—Again: African American 
Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1329 (2003) (“[I]n the 
short run, the United States will lack unfettered moral authority and international standing to sustain a 
preemptive worldwide war on terror unless it fully and fairly redresses the continuing harms of its own 
historic government-sponsored terrorizing of a significant segment of its populace.”); Stephanie M. 
Weinstein, Note, A Needed Image Makeover: Interest Convergence and the United States’ War on Ter-
ror, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 403, 428 (2006). 
35  See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Marriage Partners, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008, § MM, at 26.  Professor 
Kenji Yoshino asserted that advocates of same-sex marriage should incorporate the strategic insights of 
Professor Bell’s interest-convergence thesis into the campaign to achieve marital equality.  Contemplat-
ing recent and upcoming popular votes regarding the permissibility of same-sex marriage, Professor Yo-
shino suggested that if unmarried heterosexual couples thought that prohibiting same-sex marriage 
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Given the theory’s prominence within the legal academy and beyond, it 
is surprising that virtually no sustained scholarly attention has been dedicat-
ed to examining the interest-convergence thesis, the assumptions that un-
dergird the thesis, and the consequences that flow from accepting the thesis.  
Although the interest-convergence thesis is cited with great regularity, the 
articles that refer to the idea almost invariably invoke the idea as a kind of 
received wisdom.  The few scholarly works that criticize the thesis, more-
over, tend to do so in a fleeting manner.37  This Article initiates a critical 
discussion of the interest-convergence thesis—a discussion that is long 
overdue.   
This Article proceeds in three principal parts.  In order to contextualize 
my critique, Part I provides a brief overview of the interest-convergence 
theory.  Rather than merely summarizing the article that coined the term, 
however, this overview identifies the theory’s precursors within Professor 
Bell’s work.  The overview then closely examines the article that unveiled 
the “interest-convergence” terminology and explores how that notion has 
subsequently been offered to explain contemporary racial developments.  
This Part and the ensuing critique draw upon many of Professor Bell’s writ-
ings throughout his career in order to gain a full appreciation of the interest-
convergence theory.  This eclectic approach is not only appropriate but ne-
cessary because Professor Bell has repeatedly returned to the theory, both 
explicitly and implicitly, in his scholarly efforts to address contemporary 
racial dynamics.  In the parlance of Isaiah Berlin, Professor Bell more 
closely resembles a hedgehog than a fox,38 and confining this examination 
of the interest-convergence theory to only its earliest manifestations would 
artificially constrain the inquiry.   
With a foundational understanding of the interest-convergence theory 
in place, Part II identifies and examines four analytical flaws that diminish 
the theory’s persuasiveness.  First, the theory’s overly broad conceptualiza-
tion of “black interests” and “white interests” obscures the intensely con-
tested disputes regarding what those terms actually mean.  Second, the in-
interest-convergence theory incorrectly suggests that the racial status of 
                                                                                                                 
would imperil their own lives (e.g., through lost health care coverage), measures designed to limit mar-
riage would more likely be defeated at the ballot box.  Professor Yoshino wrote: “If more straights could 
come to see marriage as a universal right that belongs to all human beings, that would, indeed, be a con-
vergence of interest.”  Id. 
36  See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Monroe, 513 F. Supp. 375, 380 n.11 (W.D. La. 1980).  
37  See, e.g., LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, 
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 291–92 (2002); Cashin, supra note 18, at 276–77; 
Douglas E. Litowitz, Some Critical Thoughts on Critical Race Theory, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 
525–26 (1997); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 21, at 1510–11; Suzanna Sherry, All the Supreme Court 
Really Needs to Know It Learned from the Warren Court, 50 VAND. L. REV. 459, 483 (1997).   
38  See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX: AN ESSAY ON TOLSTOY’S VIEW OF HISTORY 
13 (Phoenix 2009) (1953) (dividing influential writers into two broad categories: hedgehogs, whose 
work is dedicated to advancing one large proposition, and foxes, whose work resists distillation to a sin-
gle notion or theme). 
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blacks and whites over the course of United States history is notable more 
for continuity than for change.  Third, the interest-convergence theory ac-
cords insufficient agency to two groups of actors—black citizens and white 
judges—who have played, and continue to play, significant roles in shaping 
racial realities.  Fourth, the interest-convergence theory cannot be re-
futedand, thus, cannot be examined for its validitybecause it accom-
modates racially egalitarian judicial decisions either by contending that they 
are necessary concessions in order to maintain white racism or by ignoring 
them altogether.  
The interest-convergence theory’s analytical flaws, in turn, lead to 
harmful consequences, which are explored in Part III.  The insistence that 
fortuitous moments of converging racial interests account for favorable 
judicial and policy decisions may regrettably lead the theory’s adherents to 
limit their strategies for achieving genuine racial equality.  In addition, the 
theory’s irrefutability strengthens the racially conspiratorial viewpoint that 
is disturbingly prevalent within the black community.     
At the outset, it merits emphasizing that I believe the interest-
convergence theory warrants examination not only because it is influential, 
but also because it contains at least some persuasive force.  To be sure, 
much of the following analysis levels serious criticism and expresses deep 
misgivings about the theory’s analytical underpinnings and the conse-
quences that flow from the theory.  But the interest-convergence thesis can-
not simply be deemed beyond analysis.  While the theory is too often 
categorical where it should be nuanced and too often focused on continuity 
where it should acknowledge change, the theory nevertheless serves as a 
valuable corrective to the narrative of unambiguous triumph that plagues a 
disconcertingly large portion of scholarship regarding racial considerations 
in constitutional law.  The interest-convergence thesis, moreover, demon-
strated an admirably early understanding among legal scholars of the way in 
which domestic events cannot be viewed in utter isolation from the sur-
rounding international context.39  Whatever the theory’s shortcomings, it is 
crucial not to overlook its considerable contributions to legal discourse.   
I. EXAMINING THE INTEREST-CONVERGENCE THESIS 
Before critiquing the interest-convergence theory, it is necessary to un-
derstand the conditions that, according to the theory, lend themselves to 
achieving racial reform.  This Part endeavors to provide that overview by 
identifying the earliest articulation of that theory, examining the article that 
coined the “interest-convergence” label, and explaining the theory’s contin-




39  Cf. Dudziak, supra note 12, at 66–67 (discussing the role international relations played in setting 
civil rights agendas). 
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A. Before the Interest-Convergence Thesis 
Although many scholars believe that Professor Bell initially explored 
the notion that black advancement occurs only where black interests coin-
cide with the interests of white elites in his 1980 Harvard Law Review ar-
ticle,40 that belief is only partially accurate.  In fact, while Professor Bell did 
not dub the phenomenon “interest convergence” until 1980, he first articu-
lated the underlying theory some four years earlier.41  In Racial Remedia-
tion, Professor Bell contended that white self-interest predominantly 
accounts for any relief from racial oppression that blacks have experienced 
throughout American history: “Measurable improvement in the status of 
some blacks[] and predictions of further progress have not substantially al-
tered the maxim: white self-interest will prevail over black rights.  This un-
stated, but firmly followed principle has characterized racial policy 
decisions in this society for three centuries.”42 There is no question, Profes-
sor Bell maintained, that moral concerns regarding the subordinate status of 
blacks have not alone motivated white people to address racial inequality: 
“[E]ven a rather cursory look at American legal history suggests that in the 
past, the most significant political advances for blacks resulted from poli-
cies which were intended and had the effect of serving the interests and 
convenience of whites rather than remedying racial injustices against 
blacks . . . .”43 
Racial Remediation offered a thumbnail sketch of black history in 
America, highlighting instances that would, on the surface, appear to have 
been designed to benefit blacks, but upon closer examination could be un-
derstood as motivated by a desire to advance white interests.  Expressing 
skepticism that slavery was abolished in the North because of a sudden 
arousal of conscience following the Revolutionary War, Professor Bell con-
tended that “the major motivation for abolition of slavery in the North was 
the economic advantages emancipation promised white businessmen who 
could not efficiently use slaves, and laborers who did not wish to compete 
with slaves for jobs.”44  Professor Bell then proceeded to offer similar revi-





40  See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 18, at 271 n.67 (“Bell first articulated his enormously influential in-
terest-convergence theory in a Harvard Law Review article published in 1980.” (italics added)). 
41  Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Remediation: An Historical Perspective on Current Conditions, 
52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5 (1976) [hereinafter Bell, Racial Remediation]. 
42  Id. at 6.   
43  Id.  
44  Id. at 7.  Professor Bell also postulates that abolition had the benefit for whites of, inter alia, eli-
minating ubiquitous fears of slave revolt.  See id.   
45  See id. at 7–8 (“President Lincoln was no friend of slavery, but his primary objective was to save 
the Union.”). 
46  See id. at 9–11.   
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Turning his attention to Brown v. Board of Education,47 Professor Bell 
enumerated two broad conclusions:  
(1) the Supreme Court’s decisions in the school desegregation cases are the 
most important legal milestone ever achieved by advocates of racial equality; 
and (2) it is highly unlikely that the white self-interest factors which so clearly 
motivated earlier, less significant civil rights breakthroughs were absent when 
the Brown decisions were formulated.48   
Although Professor Bell would eventually withdraw the rosy assessment of 
Brown’s significance embodied in the first conclusion,49 his tentatively ex-
pressed second conclusion would ossify into certainty in the years to 
come.50  In explaining Brown’s white self-interest component, Professor 
Bell observed that the Court decided the case in the context of the Cold 
War.51  Declaring racial segregation unconstitutional in public schools had 
the effect of denying Communists a powerful rhetorical weapon as they 
could no longer claim that the United States formally subjugated black citi-
zens, according to Professor Bell.52  The Court’s remedial decision in 
Brown II,53 which failed to require prompt desegregation of the nation’s 
public schools, demonstrated both the nation’s desire to cultivate the ap-
pearance of racial equality and its lack of commitment to the genuine ar-
ticle.54  This pattern of advance followed quickly by retrenchment is typical 
of racial progress, Professor Bell posited, because white interests seldom 




47  Professor Bell expressed some initial hesitation, which he later overcame, about assessing a legal 
development that had occurred so recently.  See id. at 11 (“[I]t would be presumptuous to attempt almost 
contemporaneous conclusions about the Brown years.”).  This caveat indicates how dramatically the 
scholarly world has changed since the mid-1970s.  To think that a Supreme Court case may not yet be 
ripe for scholarly analysis some twenty-two years after it was decided is a jarring conception to the cur-
rent era.   
48  See id. at 11–12.   
49  See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education, 49 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 1053, 1054 (2005) [hereinafter Bell, Unintended Lessons] (claiming that people who be-
lieve that Brown was a valuable judicial victory subscribe to a hopelessly outmoded worldview).   
50  See id. at 1056 (characterizing Brown as “the definitive example that the interest of blacks in 
achieving racial justice is accommodated only when and for so long as policymakers find that the inter-
est of blacks converges with the political and economic interests of whites”). 
51  Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 12.   
52  Id.  Bell also noted that “[t]he foreign policy advantages of a pro-civil rights result in Brown were 
specifically argued to the Court in the federal government’s amicus curiae briefs.”  Id. 
53  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
54  See Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 13 (“Spurred by the need to confront a political or 
economic danger to the nation as a whole, serious racial injustice is acknowledged and enjoined, but ne-
cessary remedies are not implemented once the economic or political irritant is removed.”). 
55  Id. at 21 (“If, as I have suggested, rights for blacks require for survival a climate permeated with 
white self-interest, those rights can be expected to wither in the far more hostile atmosphere that exists 
when the interests and priorities of whites change.”). 
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Professor Bell proceeded to identify four contemporaneous doctrinal 
developments that he suggested revealed how white interests trump black 
suffering in legal adjudication.56  Two of those doctrinal developments—
peremptory strikes in jury trials and available remedies for electoral district-
ing—merit discussion here.57  With respect to the regime then governing the 
use of peremptory strikes under Swain v. Alabama,58 Professor Bell com-
plained about “jury discrimination decisions that protect black defendants 
against trials by juries from which blacks have been systematically ex-
cluded, but refuse to condemn more sophisticated and no less effective 
means of barring blacks from juries, particularly in those cases where racial 
issues are important.”59  Advancing a similar critique with respect to elec-
toral districting, Professor Bell allowed that the Court’s decision in Gomil-
lion v. Lightfoot,60 which invalidated a districting plan in Tuskegee, 
Alabama, that sought to exclude virtually all black voters from the district, 
presented a helpful development for black electoral equality.61  Professor 
Bell, however, found fault with the Court’s failure to prohibit more subtly 
discriminatory districting schemes that result in vote dilution.62  While Pro-
fessor Bell has packaged this thesis in somewhat different manners in his 
numerous recountings over the years, the core theory has remained funda-
mentally unaltered since he first articulated it thirty-five years ago.  
B. The Interest-Convergence Thesis 
Where Racial Remediation primarily used a historical lens to examine 
the subordination of black rights, Professor Bell’s Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma provided a distinctly more 
future-oriented account of the possibility for attaining black advancement.  




56  Id. at 14–16.   
57  I emphasize these two doctrinal areas because I will return to them in my theoretical critique.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 195210.  The other two areas that Professor Bell contended were indica-
tive of his theory regarding black advancement were (1) due process requirements regarding expulsions 
in public schools, and (2) the cooptation of NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), which held that the 
application of a Virginia law to the NAACP’s activities violated the freedom to associate protected by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.  Bell, Racial Remediation, su-
pra note 41, at 1416. 
58  380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
59  Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 15–16 (footnote omitted). 
60  364 U.S. 339 (1960).  
61  Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 1516. 
62  See id. at 16 (“[W]hen blacks seek to show that election districts are drawn or policies such as at-
large voting are followed that dilute seriously their political potential, they must prove that the lines or 
policies were intended to have a racially discriminatory effect.  This is not difficult in blatant situations 
like the Tuskegee case, but it becomes almost impossible in many urban districts where there is no re-
cent history of systematic exclusion and election officials are able to offer nonracial justifications for 
boundaries and procedures that have a discriminatory effect.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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ing history as a point of departure.  Nonetheless, Interest-Convergence 
principally contemplates what will be, rather than what has been. 
Professor Bell positions Interest-Convergence as a response to Profes-
sor Herbert Wechsler’s famous (and infamous) article, Toward Neutral 
Principles of Constitutional Law.63  In Neutral Principles, Professor Wech-
sler pledged allegiance to Brown’s outcome on a personal level,64 but he al-
so expressed grave skepticism about the decision’s constitutional 
legitimacy.65  In Professor Wechsler’s view, Brown could not be justified as 
invalidating a denial of equality to black citizens because such a theory re-
quires an inquiry into the motives of the legislature.66  Rather than viewing 
the problem posed by state-enforced school segregation as one of discrimi-
nation against blacks, Professor Wechsler contended that the problem 
should be viewed as a denial of the freedom to associate—a theory that has 
the virtue of applying to members of all racial groups.67  But this reconcep-
tualization of the right denied by segregation did not resolve the matter. 
“[I]f the freedom of association is denied by segregation,” Professor Wech-
sler suggested, “integration forces an association upon those for whom it is 
unpleasant or repugnant.”68    
Although Professor Bell emphasized his disagreement with Professor 




63  See Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 519 (citing Herbert Wechsler, Toward 
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959)).  Professor Wechsler’s article 
caused quite a stir among legal academics.  For particularly forceful responses to Neutral Principles’s 
questioning of Brown’s constitutional legitimacy, see Charles L. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segrega-
tion Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); and Louis Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integri-
ty: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959).  
64  Wechsler, supra note 63, at 28–29. 
65  Id. at 29.  Neutral Principles is, of course, concerned with a good deal more than Brown’s consti-
tutional legitimacy, but the Brown portion of the piece is its most controversial—and, not coincidentally, 
its most memorable.    
66  See id. at 33. 
67  See id. at 34 (“Its human and its constitutional dimensions lie entirely elsewhere, in the denial by 
the state of freedom to associate, a denial that impinges in the same way on any groups or races that may 
be involved.”).  Professor Wechsler’s concern with the associational implications of Brown finds an ava-
tar in Zora Neale Hurston, who asked: “How much satisfaction can I get from a court order for some-
body to associate with me who does not wish me near them?”  Zora Neale Hurston, Court Order Can’t 
Make Races Mix, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 11, 1955, reprinted in ZORA NEALE HURSTON, FOLKLORE, 
MEMOIRS, AND OTHER WRITINGS 95658 (1995).  
68  Wechsler, supra note 63, at 34 (“Given a situation where the state must practically choose be-
tween denying the association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it on those who would avoid 
it, is there a basis in neutral principles for holding that the Constitution demands that the claims for as-
sociation should prevail?  I should like to think there is, but I confess that I have not yet written the opi-
nion.  To write it is for me the challenge of the school-segregation cases.”).   
69  See Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 522 (“To doubt that racial segregation 
is harmful to blacks, and to suggest that what blacks really sought was the right to associate with whites, 
is to believe in a world that does not exist now and could not possibly have existed then.”).  Professor 
Bell cast his lot with Professor Black, who “correctly viewed racial equality as the neutral principle 
which underlay the Brown opinion.”  Id.; see Black, supra note 63. 
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of Neutral Principles as a descriptive matter.70  Neutral Principles appro-
priately emphasized Brown’s associational dimensions, according to Pro-
fessor Bell, as governmental institutions prioritize the effect that race-
related decisions have on whites over the effect that such decisions have on 
blacks.71  With this framework established, Professor Bell set forth the in-
terest-convergence theory, which he cast as merely the positive expression 
of the essential point in Neutral Principles:  
Translated from judicial activity in racial cases both before and after Brown, 
this principle of “interest convergence” provides: The interest of blacks in 
achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with 
the interests of whites.  However, the fourteenth amendment, standing alone, 
will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial equality for 
blacks where the remedy sought threatens the superior societal status of middle 
and upper class whites.72   
In brief, white interests, rather than black suffering, dictate the contours of 
the Equal Protection Clause.73 
Professor Bell suggested that international concerns principally moti-
vated the Court’s decision in Brown—not the Court’s sudden awakening of 
a long-dormant morality with respect to the subjugation of blacks.74  Citing 
the Supreme Court’s desegregation and busing decisions from the 1970s, 
Professor Bell contended that the temporary overlap of black and white in-
terests evident in Brown had started to recede: “[R]ecent decisions, most 
notably by the Supreme Court, indicate that the convergence of black and 
white interests that led to Brown in 1954 and influenced the character of its 
enforcement has begun to fade.”75  Professor Bell suggested that these al-




70  See Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 523.  Professor Bell’s method of of-
fering two cheers for Neutral Principles bears striking similarity to his treatment of Professor Alexander 
Bickel’s prediction that Brown “may be headed fordread wordirrelevance.”  ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 151 (1970).  Bell wrote: “When, in 1970, 
[Bickel] questioned the long-term viability of the Brown decision in a highly praised book, civil rights 
lawyers and liberal scholars were annoyed.  Few of us at that time had any doubts that we would even-
tually prevail in eradicating segregation ‘root and branch’ from the public schools.  Now, more than 
three decades later, Professor Bickel’s prediction, heavily criticized at the time, has become an unhappy 
but all too accurate reality.”  BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 94 (italics added).  
71  See Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 523 (“[I]t is clear that racial equality 
is not deemed legitimate by large segments of the American people, at least to the extent it threatens to 
impair the societal status of whites.  Hence, Wechsler’s [Neutral Principles] . . . suggests a deeper truth 
about the subordination of law to interest-group politics with a racial configuration.”). 
72  Id. (emphasis added). 
73  See id. 
74  See id. at 524–26.  Given that blacks had long sought judicial relief from racial segregation in 
educational facilities, Professor Bell asked: “What accounted, then, for the sudden shift in 1954 away 
from the separate but equal doctrine and towards a commitment to desegregation?”  Id. at 524 & n.31 
(citing Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849)).   
75  Id. at 526. 
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timate fear that, if there is not a change of course, the purported entitlement 
of whites not to associate with blacks in public schools may yet eclipse the 
hope and the promise of Brown.”76 
Turning to the road ahead, Professor Bell maintained that honoring 
Brown’s promise was possible only to the extent that black interests failed 
to diverge from white interests.77  Professor Bell hastened to add, however, 
that black educational advancement did not necessarily require racial inte-
gration.78  Instead of pursuing racial integration at all costs, he suggested 
that educational strategies should not dismiss the educational benefits that 
can accompany racially isolated schools.79  Professor Bell closed by broad-
ening his point, suggesting that racial progress more generally was predi-
cated on harnessing the potential of the interest-convergence theory.80   
C. Contemporary Views of the Interest-Convergence Thesis 
Professor Bell’s support of the interest-convergence thesis has scarcely 
diminished in the years since he first articulated it.  Indeed, he has asserted 
that the theory retains every bit of its vitality in the modern world.  In his 
book Silent Covenants, which bemoans the lack of progress achieved by the 
fiftieth anniversary of Brown, Professor Bell explicitly rejected the notion 
that the interest-convergence theory had lost its explanatory power: “It is 
easy and perhaps tempting to rationalize the history of self-interest motiva-
tion in determining the direction of racial policymaking as an interesting if 
troubling background, but hardly relevant in today’s more enlightened 
world.  There is, though, little indication that the favoring of white interests 
over black has changed.”81   
Professor Bell cites the continued elevation of white interests above 
black interests as evidence that conditions for today’s African-Americans 
are not fundamentally distinct from the conditions of their enslaved ances-
tors.82  As recently as 2004, Professor Bell suggested that the structural bar-
riers to black progress are unlikely to end anytime soon because “of 




76  Id. at 528. 
77  Id.  
78  Id. at 532. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. at 533 (“If [Brown] . . . is to remain viable, those who rely on it must exhibit the dynamic 
awareness of all the legal and political considerations that influenced those who wrote it.  Professor 
Wechsler warned us early on that there was more to Brown than met the eye. . . .   Criticism, as we in the 
movement for minority rights have every reason to learn, is a synonym for neither cowardice nor capitu-
lation.  It may instead bring awareness, always the first step toward overcoming still another barrier in 
the struggle for racial equality.”). 
81  BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 58.   
82  See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 211 (5th ed. 2004) [hereinafter BELL, 
RACE, RACISM].   
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ty.”83  With these entrenched beliefs in mind, Professor Bell instructed read-
ers to “[r]ecall the gradual emancipation plans, under which still-unborn 
slaves would have to work most of their productive lives before they could 
experience freedom” and contended that “[t]he difference in the condition 
of slaves in one of the gradual emancipation states and black people today 
is more of degree than of kind.”84  In a similar testament to what he per-
ceives as the continuity of racial relations in the United States, Professor 
Bell has contended that the absence of legally sanctioned segregation has 
not resulted in a substantive decline in racial barriers85: “Despite our suc-
cessful effort to strip the law’s endorsement from the hated ‘Jim Crow’ 
signs,” Professor Bell has written, “contemporary color barriers are less vis-
ible but neither less real nor less oppressive.”86    
The lack of change in racial conditions that Professor Bell sees when 
he surveys United States history, perhaps not surprisingly, compels him to 
suggest that blacks will never attain full racial equality.  “Racial equality is, 
in fact, not a realistic goal,” Professor Bell has explained.87  “By constantly 
aiming for a status that is unobtainable in a perilously racist America, black 
Americans face frustration and despair.”88  Racial equality for blacks will 
remain a permanently elusive goal because the racist structure will absorb 
and adapt to any challenges: “Black people will never gain full equality in 
this country.  Even those herculean efforts we hail as successful will pro-
duce no more than temporary ‘peaks of progress,’ short-lived victories that 
slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white 
dominance.”89  
II. ANALYTICAL FLAWS OF THE INTEREST-CONVERGENCE THESIS 
Despite its continued vitality and widespread acceptance, the interest-
convergence theory’s explanatory power suffers from four principal analyt-
ical flaws.  First, the interest-convergence theory’s usage of the terms 
“black interests” and “white interests” ignores the deep intraracial disa-




83  Id. 
84  Id.  The quoted passage continues: “Then, as now, blacks can progress in the society only when 
that progress is perceived by the white majority as a clear benefit to whites, or at least not a serious 
risk.”  Id.  For earlier declarations that conditions for blacks in the modern era bore a striking similarity 
to conditions for slaves, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of 
Racial Remedies, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 3, 16 (1979) [hereinafter Bell, Bakke]. 
85  Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 374 (1992) [hereinafter Bell, Racial Real-
ism]. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. at 363; see DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM, at ix (1993) [hereinafter BELL, FACES] (“[R]acism is an integral, permanent, and indestructible 
component of this society.”). 
88  Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 85, at 363.   
89  Id. at 373 (emphasis omitted).  
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excessively narrow understanding of the term “interest.”  Second, the theory 
suggests that the severely limited instances of black progress demonstrate 
that the racial status of whites and blacks has remained largely unchanged 
since the demise of slavery.  In reality, this contention ignores considerable 
racial advancement and minimizes the circumstances that black people con-
fronted when their lives were overwhelmingly controlled by the unvar-
nished racial prejudice of yesteryear.  Third, the theory accords a near total 
absence of agency to both black citizens and white citizens, including white 
judges.  Rather than merely waiting for moments of racial fortuity to strike, 
blacks have played an important role in leading the nation’s quest for racial 
equality, and they have been aided (and stymied) in that quest by white 
judges along the way.  Fourth, the theory either ignores racially egalitarian 
decisions altogether or suggests that the judiciary issues decisions that ap-
pear to be racially egalitarian when doing so is necessary to avoid the de-
stabilizing effects that would accompany validating a racially 
discriminatory law.  These two techniques work in concert to render the in-
terest-convergence thesis incapable of refutation, meaning that the theory’s 
validity cannot be assessed.  
A. Interrogating the Composition of Racial Interests 
A central component of the interest-convergence thesis stresses the 
manner in which “black interests” are subordinated to “white interests.”90  
Given that these two terms lie at the theory’s core, it is striking that Profes-
sor Bell never endeavors to define what, precisely, these terms mean.  Al-
though the terms may initially appear so obvious as to require no definition, 
the oversight is significant because grappling with those terms reveals some 
of the theory’s analytical limitations.  Even if one accepts the notion that in-
terests can be divvied up by race, the interest-convergence theory offers an 
overly simplistic view of both the ability to identify and to express what 
constitutes “black interests” and “white interests.”91  The thesis accords in-
sufficient attention to the intraracial cleavages that divide the interests of 
black people and white people.  Thus, although Professor Bell uses the 
terms “black interests” and “white interests,”92 the interest-convergence the-
sis too often views those entities as singular (“black interest” and “white in-
terest”) rather than plural.   
This view arguably contained at least some analytical coherence as ap-
plied to race relations in the United States prior to the end of Jim Crow.  It 




90  See Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 52326. 
91  See id. at 526. 
92  See id.   
93  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 166 
or Plessy94 did anything other than hurt the interest that black people collec-
tively had in achieving racial equality.  Over the course of the last half cen-
tury, however, the racial situation in America has become increasingly 
complex, and the interest-convergence thesis fails to appreciate that com-
plexity.  Given the numerous areas in the modern world where there is gen-
uine disagreement regarding which policy decisions advance the interests of 
black citizens, the interest-convergence theory’s elision of that complexity 
misguidedly puts forth an undifferentiated and unqualified conception of 
what constitutes “black interests.”  Contrary to the notion advanced by the 
interest-convergence ideology, however, there is no singular black agenda.95 
In the democratic arena, for example, nearly everyone can agree that 
ending expressly racial restrictions on access to the ballot box advanced the 
interest of blacks in racial equality.  But the creation of majority-minority 
districts, pursuant to judicial interpretations of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, has spawned a fierce debate about whether such districts advance 
black interests.96  After all, while black politicians appear to be more likely 
to be elected from majority-minority districts, the electoral districts that sur-
round the majority-minority districts are more white and more likely to 
elect Republicans.97  While such a result may well be in the interest of black 
politicians, reasonable minds can, and have, disagreed whether that result 
advances the interests of black voters, the overwhelming majority of whom 
tend to vote for Democrats.98  On a micro level, moreover, if the particular 
black person in question happens to be a Republican, increasing the number 
of Republican elected officials might well advance that individual’s concep-
tion of racial interests.   
Similarly, serious disagreements about what precisely advances the in-
terests of black citizens also appear in the realms of integration in grade 
schools, affirmative action in higher education, and the administration of 




94  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), abrogated by Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) 
(per curiam). 
95  MARY PATTILLO, BLACK ON THE BLOCK: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND CLASS IN THE CITY 2 
(2007) (dismissing the concept of a “unitary black political agenda”); see id. at 12 (“The fact of racial 
homogeneity does not preclude the importance of difference, divisions, and distinctions.”). 
96  See CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN 
AMERICANS IN CONGRESS (2006); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and 
the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (1991).  
97  See Pamela Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 
1705, 1733 (1993) (“Republicans have advanced a pure aggregation model of voting rights, assuming 
that the creation of majority-black districts will deprive white Democrats of a critical element of their 
base of support and thereby allow Republicans to win elections in predominantly white districts.  This 
convergence of their aggregative interests with those of minority voters led them to provide technical 
assistance to minority groups seeking to draw plans that would increase the number of minority seats.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
98  Grant M. Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma of Minority Representation, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1589, 
1615 (2004). 
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grade schools, many commentators have suggested that this method re-
mains a viable strategy for alleviating racial hierarchy.99  Many other com-
mentators, however, contend that, in light of the public school 
demographics in urban areas, meaningful racial integration may no longer 
be a realistic goal.100  Even apart from the practical difficulties of achieving 
racial integration, Professor Bell himself has long offered incisive and pro-
vocative arguments against the wisdom of a headlong pursuit of racial inte-
gration.101  In the context of higher education and affirmative action, 
Professor Richard Sander has advanced an empirical argument contending 
that affirmative action in law school admissions serves to hinder black ad-
vancement in the legal profession.102  That claim, however, has generated 
many rebuttals suggesting that black interests are in fact served by race-
conscious admissions practices.103  With respect to the administration of 
criminal justice, many commentators suggest that black interests would be 
served by abandoning the aggressive policing of black communities that has 
been partially responsible for a highly disproportionate number of black 
people being ensnared by the legal system.104  At least one commentator has 
argued, however, that such analyses elevate the interests of black criminals 




99  See, e.g., Gary Orfield, Why Segregation Is Inherently Unequal: The Abandonment of Brown and 
the Continuing Failure of Plessy, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1041, 1051–52 (2004).   
100  See, e.g., Kevin Brown, Reflections on Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in Parents Involved: Why Fif-
ty Years of Experience Shows Kennedy Is Right, 59 S.C. L. REV. 735, 739–40 (2008) (suggesting that 
even ardent advocates of school integration must recognize that demographic realities make achieving 
integration difficult).   
101  See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 512 (1976) (claiming that NAACP lawyers elevated their 
interest in achieving racial integration above their clients’ interest in obtaining a strong education inde-
pendent of concerns regarding racial composition).  For a thoughtful, historically based rejoinder to Pro-
fessor Bell’s Serving Two Masters, see Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Race as Identity Caricature: A Local 
Legal History Lesson in the Salience of Intraracial Conflict, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (2003).  More re-
cently, Professor Bell authored a mock judicial opinion contending that the Supreme Court should have 
affirmed Plessy and actually enforced the equal portion of the “separate but equal” doctrine.  Derrick A. 
Bell, Bell, J., Dissenting, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 185, 186 (Jack 
M. Balkin ed., 2001) (“I regret that the Court fails to see in these cases the opportunity to lay bare the 
simplistic hypocrisy of the ‘separate but equal’ standard, not by overturning Plessy, but by ordering its 
strict enforcement.”). 
102  See Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004).   
103  See, e.g., Daniel E. Ho, Affirmative Action’s Affirmative Actions: A Reply to Sander, 114 YALE 
L.J. 2011 (2005); David B. Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A Response to 
Sander, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1915 (2005). 
104  See Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct “Outside the Legitimate In-
vestigative Sphere,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 617, 625, 670 (2006) (criticizing the “over-policing” of minority 
neighborhoods and advocating a form of policing that rejects the aggressive enforcement of low-level, 
nonviolent crimes).   
105  See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 19 (1997) (“[T]he principal injury suf-
fered by African-Americans in relation to criminal matters is not overenforcement but underenforcement 
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Even under the old system of outright black subordination, however, it 
is at least plausible that determining precisely what decisions and policies 
advanced “black interests” presents an oversimplified view of racial reality.  
During Jim Crow’s reign, some black entrepreneurs owned businesses that 
thrived at least in part because white businesspeople did not welcome busi-
ness from black customers.  It is quite conceivable, then, that at least some 
members of the black elite did not welcome the destabilizing effects of seg-
regation coming to a close.106  J.L. Chestnut, a black lawyer in Selma, Ala-
bama, pressed this very point:  
[T]he ties [that the black elite] had to the white ruling hierarchy—the ties that 
established them as leaders—made them the least likely group of all to become 
involved [in the civil rights struggle].  They had the most—the best jobs, the 
largest homes—and therefore the most to lose.107   
Thus, while the end of racial segregation on a broad level surely advanced 
“black interests,” some black individuals who were thriving under the exist-
ing system must have viewed its demise as a bittersweet development: one 
that was in a general sense good for the race, but that was also at least po-
tentially bad for their pocketbooks.   
Just as the interest-convergence thesis presents an exceedingly simple 
approach to what constitutes “black interests,” so too does the thesis present 
an overly facile approach to what constitutes “white interests.”  Professor 
Bell’s appreciation of the distinction between “middle and upper class 
whites,”108 on the one hand, and “poorer whites,”109 on the other hand, offers 
a measure of analytical nuance to the standard, broad-brushed interest-
convergence analysis.  But even this layer of complexity may simultaneous-
ly mask the conflicts and divisions that exist between and within these 
groups.  The interest-convergence theory’s clumping of middle-class whites 
with upper-class whites110 may, for example, improperly lead to the conclu-
sion that those two groups hold largely indistinguishable views on racial 
                                                                                                                 
of the laws.”).  For a dispute over the wisdom of black jurors nullifying convictions of black criminal 
defendants accused of committing nonviolent crimes, compare Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullifi-
cation: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995), which extols the virtues 
of jury nullification, with KENNEDY, supra, at 1228, 295310, which condemns jury nullification be-
cause such methods violate “the politics of respectability.”    
106  See E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, BLACK BOURGEOISIE 111 (Simon & Schuster 1997) (1957) (“When 
the Negroes started a campaign for their admission to the ‘white’ cinema and the ‘white’ restaurant, the 
Negro political leader discouraged them and urged them to be loyal to Negro business enterprises.”).  
107  J.L. CHESTNUT & JULIA CASS, BLACK IN SELMA 172 (1990). 
108  Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 523.   
109  Id. at 52526.   
110  Id. at 523, 52526.  
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matters.  Even within the white upper class, moreover, white citizens have 
long voiced competing and conflicting views on the racial front.111    
Setting aside the racial component of the interest-convergence theory, 
it is worth observing that even the term “interest” can be understood to con-
tain a good deal more complexity than Professor Bell generally allows.  The 
interest-convergence theory tends to view the idea of “interest” as a singular 
and seemingly entirely self-interested concept.  To be sure, people of-
tenusually, perhapsmake decisions based upon a narrow idea of what 
will be good for them.  But human beingscomplex creatures that they 
aresometimes have multiple motivations for reaching their decisions.  In 
addition to raw material self-interest, there may be more idealized interests 
involving concepts like honor, altruism, justice, and morality.112   
To state this somewhat abstract point more concretely, contemplate 
competing notions of how to understand the Court’s decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education.  Professor Bell, along with many other scholars of 
constitutional law, emphasizes that the Court invalidated Jim Crow in ele-
mentary public school education during the 1950s because the system be-
came an embarrassment to the United States during the Cold War.113  That 
explanation may well account for some of the Court’s motivation behind 
Brownalthough the historical evidence on that front is a good deal more 




111  See Eugene L. Horowitz, “Race” Attitudes, in CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO 
139, 20305 (Otto Klineberg ed., 1944) (reporting divergent attitudes among northern college students 
regarding racial equality).  
112  Cf. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE HONOR CODE: HOW MORAL REVOLUTIONS HAPPEN (2010) 
(noting that appeals to honor have motivated individuals and societies to alter their conduct); DANIEL A. 
FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 7 (1991) (chal-
lenging the notion in public choice theory that voters, legislators, and interest groups invariably and ex-
clusively act out of “pure greed”).  
113  See supra text accompanying note 12. 
114  This Article engages principally with the theoretical underpinnings of interest convergence ra-
ther than its historical claims.  But two brief historical points merit mentioning here.  First, during the 
1950s, anti-Communist sentiment pervaded American society.  Although many desegregation advocates 
attempted to claim the mantle of anti-Communism, it is important to note that segregationists often 
claimed that advocates of integration were in fact Communists.  See JASON SOKOL, THERE GOES MY 
EVERYTHING: WHITE SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 1945–1975, at 40 (2006) (“Soon after 
the Brown decision, Senator Eastland charged that the Supreme Court was under communist control.  
The Court has become ‘indoctrinated and brainwashed by left-wing pressure groups,’ Eastland con-
tended.  The Supreme Court justices must be communists, many white southerners agreed.  Jewell 
Lamm of Middlesex, North Carolina, wrote to her congressman, ‘Personally I think all nine of the old 
political hacks ought to be exiled to Russia.’”).  Second, if Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court 
in Brown was exclusively or even principally motivated by anti-Communism, why did he neglect to 
mention it?  Chief Justice Warren’s opinion was, of course, written to be reprinted in newspapers around 
the nation and was designed to maximize acceptance among white Southerners.  See RICHARD KLUGER, 
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE 
FOR EQUALITY 699 (rev. & expanded ed. 2004) (1975) (noting that Chief Justice Warren wanted the 
opinion to be “short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical, unemotional and, above all, non-
accusatory”).  It seems reasonable to believe that even an oblique statement regarding America’s place 
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But this explanation for the outcome in Brown may also be regarded as 
incomplete.  For better or worse, widespread international disapproval has 
not historically been a sufficient condition to result in an alteration of 
American practices.115  It also seems distinctly possible that the Court found 
Jim Crow to be an international embarrassment because the practice clashed 
with its more abstract interests in justice and equality.  Segregation may 
have embarrassed some whites (including those on the Court) during the 
1950s, that is, because they came to regard the system as unjust.  Attempt-
ing to assign relative value to discrete motivations, especially when dealing 
with a multimember body, is necessarily a speculative enterprise.  The in-
terest-convergence thesis, however, often expresses certainty where it 
should admit doubt, confidently identifying a lone interest where several 
motivations may be at work.116   
In its crudest form, the interest-convergence theory can be understood 
as sharing some affinities with early articulations of law and economics.  In 
the world of law and economics, people are regarded as rational utility max-
imizers;117 in the world of interest convergence, people attempt to maximize 
the utility of racial advantage.  It also seems worth noting that the logic of 
this skeptical worldview does not necessarily limit itself to whites.  Indeed, 
the interest-convergence ideology’s steadfast denial of a genuine white in-
terest in promoting equality and justice for its own sake may be understood 
as applying to blacks, too.  Under this way of thinking, the reason that black 
people have sought racial equality is not because they believe that racial 
equality is inherently a just cause but because they believe that achieving 
racial equality will redound to their benefit.  Thus, under the interest-
                                                                                                                 
in the world or the Cold War may have been a powerful rhetorical point in achieving the Chief Justice’s 
aims.  Although it may be objected that a Cold War reference would be improper in a Supreme Court 
opinion, there are at least two responses: (1) the brief filed by the United States government made the 
argument, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6–8, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954) (No. 8), 1952 WL 82045, at *6–8, and (2) Brown is not exactly known for its adherence to tradi-
tional legal authorities, see Brown, 347 U.S. at 49495 n.11 (citing psychological studies on the effects 
of segregation). 
115  For example, despite widespread prohibition of the death penalty in Europe, the United States 
continues to uphold the death penalty.  See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (upholding imposi-
tion of capital punishment in the form of lethal injection).  Similarly, the Court has upheld the right to 
gun ownership in the face of European prohibitions on handgun ownership.  See, e.g., District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual right 
to possess firearms in the home for self-defense).  
116  Professor Bell’s early articulation of the interest-convergence theory allowed some space for 
multiple motivations.  See Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 12 (suggesting that among the 
factors explaining Brown was “a humane as well as politically aware Supreme Court”).  But such allow-
ances have generally receded from Professor Bell’s analysis.     
117  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 1 (1981) (“Although the traditional 
subject of economics is indeed the behavior of individuals and organizations in markets, a moment’s 
reflection on the economist’s basic analytical tool for studying markets will suggest the possibility of 
using economics more broadly.  That tool is the assumption that people are rational maximizers of their 
satisfactions.”). 
105:149  (2011) Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis 
 171
convergence theory, claims of injusticeeven when articulated by racial 
minoritiescan be dismissed as unprincipled and pretextual, merely a high-
minded manner of complaining that their own ox has been gored.  After all, 
why should members of oppressed groups be the only individuals who are 
capable of making claims to justice and equality that do not reek of self-
interest?  The interest-convergence ideology so understood can be inter-
preted as undermining the legitimacy of claims by blacks to racial equali-
ty.118       
B. Consistency and Inconsistency of Racial Status  
The interest-convergence theory holds that, because black people re-
ceive relief from racial oppression only when it suits the interests of the 
white establishment, the status of blacks and the status of whites remained 
relatively constant throughout the latter half of the twentieth century—and 
perhaps even throughout the nation’s entire history.  According to Professor 
Bell, as discussed above,119 the interest-convergence theory at work 
throughout United States history links contemporary racial developments to 
the unvarnished racism of seemingly bygone eras.  This misperception—
that the status of blacks and whites has been characterized by continuity ra-
ther than change during the last several decades—erroneously minimizes 
one of the leading transformations of American society during that time.  
One need not believe that racism has been completely vanquished or that 
there is no longer any advantage associated with whiteness to acknowledge 
that the status of both racial groups has experienced profound transforma-
tions since World War II.   
1. Status of Blacks.—Professor Bell has long asserted that the inter-
est-convergence theory reveals how contemporary blacks have a good deal 
in common with their enslaved ancestors: “The difference in the condition 
of slaves in one of the gradual emancipation states and black people today 
is more of degree than of kind.”120  Under this view, the fall of Jim Crow 
was largely a formality, as conditions for African-Americans in the modern 
era retain an eerie similarity to the days of yore.  Even though signs indicat-
ing separate water fountains for blacks and whites have long since disap-
peared, Professor Bell asserts that “contemporary color barriers are less 
visible but neither less real nor less oppressive.”121   
While it may seem that to state this point is to refute it, arguments as-
serting an absence of genuine racial change for contemporary black citizens 
are surprisingly widespread.  Indeed, in the face of the overwhelming evi-




118  By extension, this analysis applies with equal force to claims of social justice made by members 
of other oppressed groups on their own behalf.   
119  See supra Part I. 
120  Bell, Bakke, supra note 84, at 16; see also BELL, RACE, RACISM, supra note 82, at 211. 
121  Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 85, at 374. 
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spect to race relations since World War II,122 the notion that conditions have 
improved for blacks only on the margins enjoys prominent support both in 
the legal academy123 and in the larger culture.124  Accordingly, it is necessary 
to observe that the racial existence of blacks in modern America would be 
unrecognizable, and perhaps even unfathomable, to their enslaved forefa-
thers.  Contending that the existence of blacks today can be analogized to 
people who were literally (not metaphorically) denied their freedom or to 
people who had their liberty thoroughly circumscribed by Jim Crow mini-
mizes the suffering of individuals who endured the yoke of unrelenting ra-
cial oppression.   
While the goal of racial equality has certainly not yet been fully rea-
lized, the racial progress that has been made over the generations has dra-
matically elevated the racial status of blacks.  Examples abound of racial 
progress for blacks in their everyday lives.125  To appreciate the genuine ra-
cial progress that has been made, it is necessary merely to recall the Su-
preme Court’s statements in notorious cases openly acknowledging and 
affirming the inferior social status of blacks.  In Dred Scott v. Sandford, 
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion stated that, in the eyes of the Framers, blacks 




122  See Marshall H. Medoff, Discrimination and the Occupational Progress of Blacks Since 1950, 
44 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 295, 295 (1985) (finding that “the occupational position of Blacks relative to 
Whites showed substantial improvement between 1950 and 1980 in both the North and South and the 
United States as a whole”); Tamar Jacoby, Whatever Became of Integration?, WASH. POST, June 28, 
1998, at C2 (“Blacks as a group have made enormous progress in the past three or four decades.  The 
black middle class has quadrupled, education levels have soared and blacks are increasingly represented 
in electoral politics and other influential realms of national life.”).  
123  See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 2 (2010) (“What has changed since the collapse of Jim Crow has less to do with the 
basic structure of our society than with the language we use to justify it. . . .  We have not ended racial 
caste in America; we have merely redesigned it.”); Charles Ogletree, Jr., Black Man’s Burden: Race and 
the Death Penalty in America, 81 OR. L. REV. 15, 23 (2003) (“[T]he only difference between lynching 
and capital punishment is the gloss of legality and procedural regularity that the latter enjoys.  In this 
regard, application of the death penalty may be fairer than the vigilante justice that characterized the Jim 
Crow era, but not by much.”). 
124  See, e.g., RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: HOW BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS MAKES 
RACE RELATIONS WORSE 67 (2008) (describing how pop singer Prince claimed that his record label 
had made him a “slave”). 
125  Philip Elman, who worked in the Solicitor General’s office during the fall of Jim Crow, offers a 
pithy portrait of black life in Washington, D.C., before the Court deemed state-sanctioned racial segre-
gation impermissible.  Philip Elman, The Solicitor General’s Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil 
Rights Litigation, 1946–1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 82324 (1987) (“You have to 
remember that in 1952 the District of Columbia was a southern city; it had separate black and white 
school systems.  Negroes were barred from eating in downtown restaurants.  The only places they could 
eat were in the black ghettos.  If Thurgood Marshall came to Washington to argue a case in the Supreme 
Court, he could not stay in a downtown hotel; he had to go out to Fourteenth and U Street, to the Dunbar 
Hotel.  Even at the Supreme Court, the only blacks were messengers.  There was no black in the Clerk’s 
or Marshall’s office, no black on the police force; they were considered white man’s jobs.  It seems in-
credible today, but that’s the way it was not too long ago.”).   
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order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social 
or political relations.”126  In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court made the then-
unremarkable point that a black man “is not lawfully entitled to the reputa-
tion of being a white man.”127  Not only would such arguments no longer 
appear in the U.S. Reports but they would no longer be uttered in polite 
company.  The significance of that change cannot be underestimated. 
The Supreme Court has, moreover, played at least some role in closing 
the gap between the status of blacks and the status of whites.  While many 
Supreme Court cases involving race received a great deal of attention be-
cause they seemed dramatic, it is perhaps most helpful here to remember a 
case that affected the quotidian.  Not long ago, black people were typically 
denied the honor of being addressed formally, even in formal settings.  
Among the list of racial slights that Martin Luther King Jr. listed in his Let-
ter from Birmingham City Jail as justifying his civil disobedience was the 
refusal of white people to accord blacks the respect of using formal titles:  
I guess it is easy for those who have never felt the stinging darts of segregation 
to say, “Wait.”  But when you have seen vicious mobs lynch your mothers and 
fathers at will and drown your sisters and brothers at whim; . . . when your first 
name becomes “nigger” and your middle name becomes “boy” . . . and when 
your wife and mother are never given the respected title “Mrs.” . . .  then you 
will understand why we find it difficult to wait.128 
One year after King wrote his celebrated letter, the Supreme Court decided 
Hamilton v. Alabama.129  In that case, the Supreme Court reversed the con-
tempt conviction of a black woman who refused to answer questions ad-
dressed to “Mary” as opposed to “Miss Hamilton.”  Hamilton thus offers a 
prime instance of the judiciary refusing to permit black citizens to be treated 
with diminished status before the law.  And in so doing, Hamilton 
represents a sharp break from the past in a way that is at once simple and 
profound. 
2. Status of Whites.—Professor Bell suggests that the principal inter-
est that whites are motivated to protect is their “superior societal status” as 




126  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
127  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549 (1896), abrogated by Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 
(1956) (per curiam). 
128  Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail (1963), reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF 
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 289, 292–93 (James Melvin Washing-
ton ed., 1986). 
129  376 U.S. 650 (1964).   
130  Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 523.  Professor Bell has sometimes ex-
plicitly suggested that racial “status” includes an economic component.  See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Waiting 
on the Promise of Brown, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 345 (1975) (“Full implementation of 
Brown remains an uncertain future prospect because of the continuing resistance of many whites who 
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clear that racial equality is not deemed legitimate by large segments of the 
American people, at least to the extent it threatens to impair the societal sta-
tus of whites.”131  If there is a conflict between white status, on the one 
hand, and black rights, on the other, there is no question that white status 
will prevail.132   
The increasing status of blackness is, of course, intimately connected 
to the decreasing status of whiteness as an automatic entitlement to exalted 
social standing.  As blacks and other people of color have received the dig-
nitary effects traditionally reserved for whites, it follows that whiteness, on 
its own, has decreased in value.  Justice Stanley Reed keenly felt that de-
creased value of whiteness after the Supreme Court agreed to a tentative 
resolution at its conference in the case of District of Columbia v. John R. 
Thompson Co.133  In that case, the Court considered whether restaurants in 
Washington, D.C., could continue to prohibit black people from dining on 
the premises.  Justice Reed, who lived with his wife at Washington’s May-
flower Hotel, was reported to have said after the Court agreed unanimously 
in conference to invalidate the racial restrictions on dining in the nation’s 
capital: “Why—why this means that a nigra can walk into the restaurant at 
the Mayflower and sit down to eat at the table right next to Mrs. Reed!”134  
Where it once would have been risible to suggest that whites benefit 
from cross-racial interactions, by 1972 a unanimous Burger Court held in 
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. that—in the face of racially 
discriminatory rental practices—white plaintiffs have standing to sue for the 
“loss of important benefits from interracial associations.”135  Assuming that 
antidiscrimination law is, as Professor Wechsler posited, fundamentally 
about the right of association,136 the Court made it clear well before Profes-
sor Bell articulated the interest-convergence theory that it would not permit 
whites’ desire for strictly intraracial interactions to trump the desire for in-
terracial contact.  In considerable tension with a central tenet of interest 
convergence, Trafficante illustrates the Court’s rejection of whites’ interest 
in maintaining racial exclusivity as a ground for protecting white social su-
periority.   
None of the foregoing should be interpreted as contending that whites 
are not accorded certain benefits as a result of their race that are routinely 
denied to blacks.  Indeed, race and racial considerations continue to exer-
cise meaningful influence on the lives of Americans of all races.  I mean to 
                                                                                                                 
fear that the realization of ‘equal educational opportunities’ for blacks will mean the loss of economic 
and status benefits that they and their children now enjoy solely on the basis of race.”). 
131  Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 523.   
132  See id. 
133  346 U.S. 100 (1953).   
134  KLUGER, supra note 114, at 598. 
135  409 U.S. 205, 209–10, 212 (1972). 
136  Wechsler, supra note 63, at 34.    
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suggest merely that whiteness qua whiteness has decreased in status as 
black citizenship and humanity have become everyday features of Ameri-
can life.137  Although a good deal of my analysis focuses on improvements 
in race relations, that focus should not be taken as an indication that I be-
lieve racial prejudice no longer exists, or even that it imposes merely neg-
ligible effects on racial minorities.  Conditions are far from perfect on 
America’s racial front, a fact that is never more apparent than during diffi-
cult economic times.138  Acknowledging racism’s continued effects does not 
mean, however, that it is impossible to acknowledge simultaneously that the 
racial progress blacks have achieved since World War II has been anything 
less than profound.139   
C. Lack of Agency 
The interest-convergence thesis accords an almost complete absence of 
agency to two groups of actors who exercise a great deal of control regard-
ing the advancement of black interests: the black citizenry and the white ju-
diciary.140  By implicitly encouraging black citizens to await the magical 
moment when their interests converge with the white majority, the interest-
convergence thesis sharply discounts the capacity of black people to partic-
ipate in their own uplift.  Conversely, by reducing white judges to mere 
functionaries who do the bidding of the white establishment, the interest-
convergence thesis simultaneously diminishes the culpability of white 
judges who exercise their authority to maintain the existing racial hierarchy 
and denies the credit owed to white members of the judiciary who challenge 




137  See SOKOL, supra note 115, at 4 (“The civil rights movement altered race relations, overturned 
ingrained practices, subverted traditions, ushered in political change, transformed institutions, under-
mined a way of life, and even turned cities upside down . . . .”).   
138  See, e.g., Michael Powell, Decades of Gains Vanish for Blacks in Memphis, N.Y. TIMES, May 
31, 2010, at A1 (noting that “rising unemployment and growing foreclosures in the recession have com-
bined to destroy black wealth and income and erase two decades of slow progress”). 
139  See Michael Powell, 45 Years Later, Witnesses to Dr. King’s Dream See a New Hope, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2008, at A1 (reporting the comments of Congressman and former civil rights activist 
John Lewis who said, “When people say nothing has changed, I feel like saying, ‘Come walk in my 
shoes.’”). 
140  There are, of course, nonblack citizens and nonwhite judges who are important actors in shaping 
American race relations.  This Article addresses black citizens and white judges because they are, from 
the interest-convergence vantage point, at the opposite ends of society’s power structure.  It is worth not-
ing, though, that Professor Bell does not discuss black members of the judiciary in the context of the in-
terest-convergence theory.  Were interest-convergence adherents to contemplate black judges, they 
might advance two principal arguments.  First, they might contend that black people who are sufficiently 
palatable to the establishment so as to be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate are, 
virtually by definition, disinclined to seek profound racial reform.  Cf. Lewis M. Steel, A Critic’s View 
of the Warren Court—Nine Men in Black Who Think White, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1968, § 6 (Magazine), 
at 56.  Second, they might contend that, even assuming that a few right-thinking black judges could 
sneak through the process with their righteous views undetected, not enough such judges could be con-
firmed so as to make any meaningful difference in the lives of black people. 
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1. Black Citizens.—The interest-convergence theory’s assertion that 
blacks are permitted to advance only when white interests permit them to 
do so offers an inaccurately anemic conception of the ability of black 
people to create change on their own behalf.  The theory’s emphasis on for-
tune and happenstance illuminates the theory’s low regard for black agen-
cy.141  Although Professor Bell briefly acknowledges that black people are 
not in fact inanimate objects, he makes it clear that their actions play an ex-
tremely limited role in shaping racial reality.  Professor Bell writes:  
Blacks are not neutral observers in their subordinate status, but even their most 
strenuous efforts seldom enable them to break free of a social physics in which 
even the most blatant discrimination is ignored or rationalized until black peti-
tions find chance harmony with white interests.  Racial justice, then, when it 
comes, arrives on the wings of racial fortuity rather than hard-earned entitle-
ment.  Its departure, when conditions change, is preordained.142   
Rather than black advancement being principally driven by canny litigation 
strategies, political mobilization, or other modes of self-assertion, interest 
convergence instead views black people as mere “fortuitous beneficiaries” 
and instructs them to expect (even fleeting) advances toward racial equality 
only if they possess the good luck to have their interests be perceived as 




141  BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 59 (“While blacks had been petitioning the courts 
for decades to find segregation unconstitutional, by 1954 a fortuitous symmetry existed between what 
blacks sought and what the nation needed.”).  Professor Bell was not, of course, the only person who 
viewed Brown as the product of fortuity.  Indeed, Justice Frankfurter famously viewed the unanimous 
decision in Brown as the result of divine fortune.  See JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 57 (2001) (describing how Jus-
tice Felix Frankfurter called the death of Chief Justice Fred Vinson “the first indication I have ever had 
that there is a God”).   
142  BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 9.   
143 Again, Professor Bell’s early formulation of the interest-convergence thesis demonstrated consi-
derably greater awareness of both black agency and the need to pursue multiple strategies for racial 
reform simultaneously.  See Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 28 (“The quest for racial equali-
ty cannot be delegated.  Programs and policies should be structured to harmonize with the principle: ‘no 
one can free black people but themselves.’”); id. at 14 (“[T]he quest by blacks for racial justice has re-
sulted in dozens of major court decisions that led to social reforms of general significance.  These deci-
sions are seldom society’s gifts.  The litigation is usually carefully planned and intelligently executed.” 
(footnote omitted)).  Such statements, alas, seldom appeared in subsequent iterations of the interest-
convergence thesis and were typically watered down when they did appear.  See, e.g., BELL, SILENT 
COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 71 (“[R]acial policy actions may be influenced, but are seldom deter-
mined, by the seriousness of the harm blacks are suffering, by the earnest petitions they have argued in 
courts, by the civil rights bills filed in legislative chambers, or even by impressive protests conducted in 
the streets.  None of these change blacks’ status as fortuitous beneficiaries.”).   
This strikingly passive approach to agency afflicts many adherents to the interest-convergence 
theory.  For example, Professor Yoshino contends, in explaining Professor Bell’s thesis, that Brown 
“happened in part because” of the Cold War.  See Yoshino, supra note 35.  Supreme Court cases do not, 
of course, simply “happen[]”; rather, parties brief cases, and Supreme Court Justices decide those cases.  
See also Lubinski, supra note 31, at 412 (“The [interest-convergence] theory . . . provides animal advo-
cates with the rhetoric required for a successful campaign and the precedent to persist—eventually the 
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The interest-convergence theory risks reducing black people to the role 
of bystanders to the events of American history, individuals who occasion-
ally get swept up in the current of world affairs but have a negligible role in 
shaping those affairs.  So limited is their ability to shape their own realities, 
so complete is their subordination, that, in the absence of racial fortuity, 
struggling against the prevailing racial order constitutes an exercise in fu-
tility.  In a passage that illuminates blacks’ supposed inability to shape the 
world around them, Professor Bell contends: “It is as though black people 
are trapped in a giant, unseen gyroscope.  Even their most powerful exer-
tions fail either to divert the gyroscopic prison from its preplanned equili-
brium, or to alter its orientation toward dominance for whites over 
blacks.”144   
Black people, however, are not trapped in invisible gyroscopes.  Nor 
are they potted plants.  Even in the context of the brutally dehumanizing in-
stitution of slavery, black people were able to exercise various modes of re-
sistance and exert at least some control within their thoroughly unenviable 
environments.145  More recently, the civil rights movement—with both its 
legal component conceived of by Charles Hamilton Houston146 and the di-
rect action component principally identified with Martin Luther King 
Jr.147—demonstrates that black people can assert their rights and succeed in 
bringing about real racial change even in the face of stifling racial oppres-
sion.  Rather than waiting for fortune to smile upon them, these black 
people—and many more over the centuries—took fortune into their own 
hands and helped bend history to their will.  Viewing African-Americans as 
mere “fortuitous beneficiaries” who are trapped in a “preplanned equili-
brium” improperly suggests that the decisions and actions of black people 
are far less important, tending toward the irrelevant, in comparison with 
what whites deem permissible.  In this manner, an absolutist conception of 
interest convergence may place an artificial limit upon what black people 
can achieve.      
The interest-convergence theory’s minimization of black agency also 
may have the regrettable effect of undermining the achievement of individ-
                                                                                                                 
stars will align and breakthroughs will ensue.”).  Although Lubinski’s excerpted analysis sounds almost 
satirical, read in context it appears to be sincere.      
144  BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 77.   
145  See, e.g., STEVEN HAHN, A NATION UNDER OUR FEET: BLACK POLITICAL STRUGGLES IN THE 
RURAL SOUTH FROM SLAVERY TO THE GREAT MIGRATION (2003).   
146  See generally KLUGER, supra note 114, at 125–31, 147–56 (providing Houston’s biography and 
detailing his involvement in the campaign for civil rights); GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: 
CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 13155 (1983) (describing Hou-
ston’s work as Special Counsel for the NAACP); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY 
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (1987) (discussing the NAACP legal strategy). 
147  See DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN 
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 8586 (First Quill 1999) (1986); see also Randall Kennedy, Mar-
tin Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999, 
102024 (1989) (describing King’s background and involvement in the beginning of the bus boycotts). 
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ual blacks.  In the event that a black person should achieve distinction in the 
professional world, interest convergence suggests that the white establish-
ment permitted that black person’s achievement as a small concession ne-
cessary to advance white interests and maintain racial order.148  “Successful 
blacks serve white interests by providing the rationalizing link between the 
nation’s espousal of racial equality and its practice of racial dominance,” 
Professor Bell has written.  “The unspoken and totally facetious maxim is 
that with self-improvement, the opportunity is available for all blacks to be 
successful.”149  While it would certainly go too far to suggest that black 
people exercise no control whatsoever regarding their occupational fates 
under the interest-convergence theory, the talent of the black individuals, 
say, in the laboratory or in the archives would appear to be relatively incon-
sequential in comparison to the white interests that select a small number of 
blacks to succeed.  The interest-convergence theory might be understood as 
viewing a successful individual black person less as a role model and more 
as a miragean illusion that succeeds principally in legitimating black 
subordination.150       
To be sure, the interest-convergence theory does not wholly remove all 
traces of black agency.  When the theory does allow for black agency, how-
ever, the amount of influence accorded black people over their own fates is 
a decidedly marginal phenomenon.  In his analysis of Brown, for instance, 
Professor Bell observes that the NAACP’s brief in the case, in addition to 
the Solicitor General’s amicus brief, argued that invalidating segregated 
schools could aid the nation in waging the Cold War.151  Similarly, Profes-
sor Bell praises the efforts of the lawyers who won Grutter and Gratz for 
trumpeting the importance of diversity in an effort to appeal to the interest-




148  See Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 24.   
149  Id.   
150  Professor Bell’s emphasis on the legitimation aspect of black success may well stem from a de-
sire to avoid a sense of complacency on the part of individuals who are now interested in pursuing racial 
equality.  This anti-complacency motivation may also account for his insistence that America’s racial 
climate remains largely unchanged since slavery.  Although I share Professor Bell’s concern that pro-
found racial inequality continues to plague this nation, we appear to part company regarding which tac-
tics will prove most helpful in addressing that inequality.  In contrast to Professor Bell, it is my sense 
that forthrightly acknowledging considerable racial progress willin addition to having the virtue of 
striking people as accurateprevent individuals from believing that racial problems are intractable.  Of 
course, it is also distinctly possible that a combination of approaches may well prove most effective in 
combating racial inequality.        
151  See Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 524 (“[T]he decision helped to pro-
vide immediate credibility to America’s struggle with Communist countries to win the hearts and minds 
of emerging third world peoples.  At least this argument was advanced by lawyers for both the NAACP 
and the federal government.”).   
152  See Bell, Unintended Lessons, supra note 49, at 1066 (“Once revealed as a motivating factor, in-
terest convergence can be transformed into useful strategy.  Those that defended the University of Mich-
igan’s affirmative action plans, for example, utilized interest convergence by promoting diversity as 
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crabbed understanding of what black individuals and other advocates of 
black advancement can do to achieve racial uplift.  Appealing to interest-
convergence sentiments is surely a valuable tool, but it should not be re-
garded as the only tool that is available.  Because notions of interest can be 
so complex and varied,153 it seems misguided to appeal only to an extremely 
narrow conception of self-interest.  Confining black agency to operating 
within the interest-convergence paradigm artificially serves to constrain ra-
cial possibilities.   
2. White Judges.—Just as the interest-convergence theory improperly 
minimizes the agency of black citizens, it does the same to white citizens.  
The denial of agency to one particular group of white citizenswhite 
judgesmerits scrutiny here in light of their perceived centrality to imple-
menting the interest-convergence thesis.  Indeed, the theory is predicated on 
the belief that legal decisions involving race are not made by individual 
judges who choose from a range of judicial determinations but instead are 
driven by a seemingly compelled predisposition to maintaining racial hi-
erarchy.  This minimization at once denies culpability to members of the 
judiciary who have ratified racism through their decisions and denies credit 
to members of the judiciary who have rejected racism.  Although judges not 
infrequently make value-laden assessments regarding competing ideals in 
writing judicial decisions,154 the interest-convergence theory incorrectly 
views judges primarily as mere automatons who almost invariably maxi-
mize the interests of whites.   
While the interest-convergence theory appropriately suggests that more 
motivated the Supreme Court’s racially egalitarian decisions than moral 
outrage at the injustice of legally sanctioned racism, the theory incorrectly 
gives short shrift to the moral agency that was central to those decisions.155  
In the middle third of the twentieth century, an all-white Supreme Court is-
sued a number of decisions that confronted the racist treatment of blacks in 
a variety of contexts, including the electoral,156 residential,157 and, yes, the 
educational.158  To pretend that such decisions, and similar decisions in the 
                                                                                                                 
being in the self-interest of the University.  Interest convergence was part of their strategy, planned for 
in advance, rather than a happy coincidence recognized in retrospect.” (footnote omitted)).  
153  See supra Part II.A. 
154  See KLARMAN, supra note 15, at 57. 
155  On the moral implications of Brown, see J. HARVIE WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION 62 (1979) (“No single decision has had more moral force 
than Brown; few struggles have been morally more significant than the one for the racial integration of 
American life.”).   
156  See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (protecting a citizen’s right to participate 
in primary elections). 
157  See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (deeming racially restrictive covenants 
uneforceable).   
158  See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 
339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
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lower courts, were produced by a judiciary that was concerned primarily 
with maintaining whites’ superior position in society denies those judges 
the plaudits that they deserve for issuing those decisions.159   
A central part of the interest-convergence theory’s conspiratorial out-
look is the casting of Supreme Court Justices in the role of omniscient con-
spirators.  Under the interest-convergence theory, Justices resemble less a 
collection of individuals with varying ideological commitments than an un-
differentiated mass composed of diabolical seers who are dedicated to pro-
longing black subordination by protecting white interests.160  The interest-
convergence theory does not allow that judicial decisions involving race 
may result in unintended consequences.  Instead, under the interest-
convergence theory, the Supreme Court issues decisions with an intent, and 
those decisions seemingly invariably have their desired effect.161  Rather 
than being all-knowing demigods, however, there is ample reason to believe 
that Justices often fail to appreciate the impact that their decisions will ul-
timately have on the nation.162  This statement, it has been argued, applies 
with particular force regarding the Court’s decisions involving race.163   
While the history of the United States judiciary does not want for unre-
constructed racists,164 it is important to honor the judges who have affirma-




159  See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitu-
tion: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 110 (2003) (“Because the Court in Brown was 
deeply committed as a matter of professional belief to the constitutional value of nondiscrimination, it 
was willing to undertake extraordinary efforts to transform constitutional culture.”). 
160  Professor Bell has, on at least two occasions, singled out particular Justices for writing opinions 
worthy of praise.  See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., California’s Proposition 209: A Temporary Diversion on the 
Road to Racial Disaster, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1447, 145758 (1997) (praising Justice Stevens’s dis-
senting opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting), for 
encouraging the Court to acknowledge the constitutional distinction between programs designed to per-
petuate racial subordination and programs designed to eradicate racial subordination); Bell, Diversity’s 
Distractions, supra note 10, at 1624 (praising Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Gratz v. Bollin-
ger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), for its acknowledgement that the current racial dis-
parities are owed to historical injustices).  It is no coincidence that both of these opinions are in dissent. 
161  See, e.g., Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 6 (“[E]ven a rather cursory look at Ameri-
can legal history suggests that in the past, the most significant political advances for blacks resulted 
from policies which were intended and had the effect of serving the interests and convenience of whites 
rather than remedying racial injustices against blacks . . . .”).   
162  See LUCAS A. POWE JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–2008, at 279 
(2009) (contending that none of the Justices realized that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), would be-
come an intensely reviled decision); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Ref-
lections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 
362–63 (1995) (observing that, although the Supreme Court may have thought that its decision in Fur-
man v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), inflicted a fatal blow to the practice of capital punishment within 
the United States, that decision may have in fact helped to revive the practice).  
163  See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 15, at 389–408 (suggesting that Brown did not bring integration 
to the South but that it did succeed in eliminating the space for Southern moderate politicians on the ra-
cial question).  
164  See id. at 81 (labeling Justice James McReynolds “a notorious racist”). 
105:149  (2011) Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis 
 181
South Carolina issued opinions regarding blacks that challenged the racial 
hierarchy so thoroughly that white racists drove him from his home, forcing 
him to retire from the bench and to flee his home state for New York 
City.165  In a dissent in Briggs v. Elliott,166 one of the five cases that even-
tually became known as Brown v. Board of Education, Judge Waring ex-
pressly conceived of racial segregation as a moral problem: “[S]egregation 
in education can never produce equality and . . . is an evil that must be era-
dicated. . . .  [T]he system of segregation in education adopted and practiced 
in the State of South Carolina must go and must go now.  Segregation is per 
se inequality.”167  Moral agency motivated Judge Waring’s opinion attack-
ing segregation in Briggs, just as it motivated the majority opinion in Briggs 
that defended segregation.  Denying the credit that is owed to the Judge 
Warings of the world is unwise because judges will be unlikely to issue 
progressive decisions on raceor other legal areas involving inequalityif 
they believe that their decisions will ultimately be understood as only pro-
tecting the prevailing order.  The interest-convergence theory’s minimiza-
tion of agency thus provides a myopic view of judicial behavior in all its 
moral dimensions.   
D. Irrefutability 
The interest-convergence theory is also marred by the impossibility of 
refuting its validity.  In responding to Grutter, Professor Bell allows himself 
some measure of “a prophet’s pride” because, in his view, the Court em-
braced affirmative action in light of the policy being pitched as advancing 
establishment interests.168  Like many self-styled prophets, however, Profes-
sor Bell can tout his foresight not least because he espouses a view of the 
world that is fundamentally incapable of being falsified by subsequent 
events.  All judicial decisions involving race can, if subjected to sufficiently 
intense scrutiny, be understood to affirm the existence of the interest-
convergence theory at work.169  The interest-convergence theory’s irrefuta-
bility, moreover, is intensified by Professor Bell’s tendency to minimize 




165  See J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION 10 (1961).  Another example of a federal judge who was driven from the South is 
Judge J. Skelly Wright of Louisiana, who was labeled by local whites “Judas Wright” and “a traitor to 
his class.”  PATTERSON, supra note 141, at 107; see also PELTASON, supra, at 237 (describing how Loui-
siana legislators called for Judge Wright’s imprisonment and condemned President-elect Kennedy for 
refusing to repudiate Judge Wright); see generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (Univ. of Ala. Press 
1990) (1981) (chronicling the Fifth Circuit’s response to the Court’s decree of “all deliberate speed” in 
Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), focusing upon Judges Richard Rives, John Brown, John Minor Wisdom, 
and Elbert Tuttle).   
166  98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951). 
167  Id. at 547–48 (emphasis omitted). 
168  Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, supra note 10, at 1624.   
169  For an early critique of this point, see Litowitz, supra note 37, at 525–26.  
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1. Contradiction-Closing Cases.—In his Foreword to the Harvard 
Law Review, Professor Bell explains why some cases that might initially be 
viewed as racial advances reveal themselves to be, upon closer inspection, 
merely legitimations of the prevailing racial hierarchy.170  If legal rules ex-
pose the underpinnings of racism in an excessively blatant manner,171 the in-
terest-convergence theory provides that the judiciary may grant some relief 
to black people because doing so serves larger white societal interests: 
namely, an interest in the appearance of meritocracy and an interest in the 
social stability necessary to avoid racial unrest.  Professor Bell dubs these 
ostensible victories for racial equality “contradiction closing cases,” be-
cause “they narrow the gap between white and black rights that the framers 
wrote into the Constitution.”172  Contradiction-closing cases “serve as a 
shield against excesses in the exercise of white power, yet they bring about 
no real change in the status of blacks.”173  Professor Bell suggests that such 
cases “provide[] blacks and liberals with the sense that the system is not so 
bad after all.”174  Professor Richard Delgado has further explained that con-
tradiction-closing cases occur “when the gap between our ideals and a per-
vasively racist reality grows too large.  Such cases legitimate a generally 
indifferent legal system, permitting dominant society to believe that it is fair 
and just.”175  
The manner in which the interest-convergence theory can accommo-
date any decision that appears to reject racial hierarchy can be glimpsed in 
Professor Bell’s recent reassessment of Brown.176  Apart from emphasizing 
the decision’s roots in geopolitical considerations, Professor Bell now 
views Brown as a decision that advanced racism by appearing to reject rac-
ism.  “You would never know it from the opposition and determined resis-




170  Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term—Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 
99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) [hereinafter Bell, Foreword].  It seems worth noting here that Professor Bell 
was the first, and for more than thirty years the only, black law professor to ever write the Foreword for 
the Harvard Law Review, perhaps the most esteemed platform that exists in legal academia.  Professor 
Guinier recently became the second member of that exclusive club.  See Lani Guinier, The Supreme 
Court 2007 Term—Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2008).  
171  See Bell, Foreword, supra note 170, at 32.  Even expressing the notion that white people would 
be “shock[ed]” or “embarrass[ed]” by blatant racism, id., evinces a great deal of progress on the racial 
front. 
172  Id.  
173  Id.  
174  Id. 
175  Delgado, Two Ways, supra note 18, at 2294 n.133 (citation omitted); see also Richard Delgado, 
Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923, 923–24 
(1988) [hereinafter Delgado, Will We Ever Be Saved?] (reviewing BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, su-
pra note 18) (“[O]ur system of civil rights statutes and case law serves a homeostatic function, assuring 
that society has exactly the right amount of racism: Too little would forfeit psychic and financial bene-
fits, too much would risk disruption.”). 
176 Bell, Unintended Lessons, supra note 49. 
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decision was actually a good deal for white Americans.”177  Professor Bell 
explained that the Court’s school desegregation decision provided a mis-
leading appearance of meritocracy: “The Brown decision’s rejection of the 
racial barriers imposed by segregation . . . reinforced the fiction that the 
path of progress was clear.  Everyone could and should succeed through in-
dividual ability and effort.”178  This foregoing analysis suggests that it is 
whites, not blacks, who prevail when racial barriers fall because the erosion 
of such barriers perpetuates the myth of racial equality.   
That a decision rejecting racial hierarchy in fact must be understood as 
reinforcing racial hierarchy lays bare the essential irrefutability of the inter-
est-convergence thesis.  Judicial decisions that seem to undermine the thesis 
are seamlessly transformed into confirmations of the thesis.  Instead of call-
ing out “heads, I win; tails, you lose,” the interest-convergence thesis simp-
ly substitutes “heads, white people win; tails, black people lose.”  
The interest-convergence theory also accounts for judicial decisions 
that advance racial equality by claiming that such decisions were inevitable 
because the statutes or laws that the Court invalidated were simply too bra-
zen in their advancement of racial subordination.  Contradiction-closing 
cases, the interest-convergence theory posits, reveal that blacks “can depend 
on the courts . . . for the correction of racial outrages.”179  But viewing judi-
cial decisions as mere “correction[s] of racial outrages” denies the exis-
tence, and even the possibility, of obtaining genuine victories on the road to 
racial equality.  Indeed, even the term “correction of racial outrages” ob-
scures racial progress, as one generation’s everyday slight is the next gener-
ation’s outrage.  The “contradiction-closing” view of the legal world, 
moreover, dismisses judicial defeats on the racial front as expected out-
comes and rejects victories for racial equality as necessary concessions in 
order to maintain the racial status quo.  According to this mindset, then, the 
judicial system sometimes seems incapable of issuing a decision that merits 




177  Id. at 1059.  
178  Id. at 1060.  This critique of legitimation was also voiced in the first sustained treatment of law 
and race by a scholar associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement.  See Alan David Freeman, 
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme 
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (1978) (claiming that Supreme Court decisions that ap-
pear to benefit blacks in fact operate to validate a racially unjust legal structure); see also Charles J. Og-
letree, Jr., Tulsa Reparations: The Survivors’ Story, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13, 21 (2004) 
(contending that whites permit “short-term gains for African Americans when doing so furthers the 
short- or long-term goals of the white elite. . . .  This is an important check on widespread disaffection 
that may end in revolution.”); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 717 
(1992) (“The mere existence of Brown thus served to . . . legitimate current arrangements.  True, many 
blacks remained poor and disempowered.  But their status was now no longer a result of the denial of 
equality.  Instead, it marked a personal failure to take advantage of one’s definitionally equal status.”). 
179  Bell, Foreword, supra note 170, at 32 (internal quotation mark omitted).   
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For example, Professor Bell dismisses the decision in Strauder v. West 
Virginia,180 which invalidated a state statute prohibiting blacks from serving 
on juries, as correcting such an obviously outrageous racial injustice that 
the Court had no alternative other than to invalidate the statute.181  Viewing 
Strauder as a prototypical contradiction-closing case that merely corrected a 
“racial outrage,” Professor Bell wrote, “Even in the bleak period after Re-
construction came to an end, a quite conservative Supreme Court was will-
ing to recognize the unfairness of convicting a black by a jury from which 
members of his race were excluded by law.”182   
Viewing Strauder as an inevitable victory for proponents of racial 
equality, however, badly misses the mark.  Strauder, lest we forget, was de-
cided some sixteen years before Plessy v. Ferguson, where the Court found 
that separate-but-equal was not only constitutionally permissible but indi-
cated that if black people took exception to Jim Crow’s indignities the prob-
lem was in their minds rather than in objective inequities.183  It is far from 
clear what renders the exclusion of blacks from juries an outrage that must 
be corrected but the exclusion of blacks from railcars a policy to be tol-
erated.  One potential explanation for these seemingly incoherent decisions 
would contend that, during the late nineteenth century, the prevailing legal 
view regarded the Reconstruction Amendments as protecting “civil” and 
“political” rights in a manner that did not extend to “social” rights.184  But 
that tidy explanation is undermined by the post-Strauder decision of Giles 
v. Harris,185 where the Supreme Court expressed impotence in its ability to 
ensure that black people could exercise the franchise in the face of deter-
mined white opposition.186  Rather than constituting an inevitable victory 
against a plainly racist statute, it is all too easy to envision the Supreme 
Court validating West Virginia’s statute in Strauder.187   
Quite apart from the underlying result in Strauder, moreover, the 
Court’s reasoning in the case struck a blow against white supremacy by re-
jecting notions of black inferiority.  In his opinion for the Court, Justice 




180  100 U.S. 303 (1880).   
181  Bell, Foreword, supra note 170, at 32.   
182  Id.  
183  See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (“We consider the underlying fallacy of the 
plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the 
colored race with a badge of inferiority.  If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but 
solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”).   
184  See Mark V. Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection 
Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM. HIST. 884, 886 (1987). 
185  189 U.S. 475 (1903). 
186  For an illuminating discussion of Giles, see Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, 
and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295 (2000).   
187  It seems worth noting here that two Justices dissented in Strauder.  See Strauder v. West Virgin-
ia, 100 U.S. 303, 339 (1880) (Field, J., dissenting).   
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The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a sta-
tute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because 
of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qual-
ified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their 
inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to se-
curing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure 
to all others.188   
The point here is not to suggest that, in the wake of Strauder, states no 
longer found ways to exclude blacks from serving on juries.  States certain-
ly did continue to exclude blacks from juries for racial reasons in the late 
nineteenth century, and they continue to do so today.189  The point, rather, is 
that the Supreme Court in Strauder refused to place its imprimatur on the 
notion that black people were, by virtue of their substandard intelligence 
and morality, uniformly unfit to deliberate with white people.  And that rea-
soning represented an important break with then-prevalent racial under-
standings.  The Supreme Court’s racially egalitarian decision in Strauder 
cannot be dismissed as a decision that sought to maintain white supremacy 
in light of the blatant nature of West Virginia’s racially exclusionary sta-
tute. 
In writing the Harvard Law Review’s Foreword to its annual Supreme 
Court issue in 1985, Professor Bell utilized a similar method to minimize 
the significance of Bob Jones University v. United States190 and Palmore v. 
Sidoti,191 two prominent cases from the 1980s in which the Court issued de-
cisions that were broadly understood to advance the cause of racial justice.  
In Bob Jones, the Court validated an Internal Revenue Service rule that de-
nied tax-exempt status to educational institutions that practiced racial dis-
crimination.192  In Palmore, the Court reversed a lower court’s decision 
withdrawing child custody from a white mother because she decided to 
marry a black man.193  One might think that such significant and recent 
Court decisions would receive more than passing reference in a Foreword 
called The Civil Rights Chronicles.  Rather than offering a sustained analy-
sis of the opinions, however, Professor Bell merely cited them in a footnote 
as instances of contradiction-closing cases.194 
2. Avoidance of Racially Egalitarian Decisions.—Although Professor 




188  Id. at 308 (majority opinion). 
189  See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF 
DEMOCRACY (Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (1994); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race 
Discrimination: The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401 (1983). 
190  461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
191  466 U.S. 429 (1984).   
192  See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 595–96. 
193  See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 434.   
194  Bell, Foreword, supra note 170, at 32 n.94.   
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ly refuses to acknowledge judicial decisions that evince racial progress.  
This is the case even when transformations occur in the very areas of the 
law that Professor Bell has suggested require judicial attention in light of 
the interest-convergence thesis.  Whatever the usual standard incumbent 
upon law professors to address doctrinal shifts that conceivably undermine 
the force of their analyses, the interest-convergence thesis is predicated on 
racial stasis and the Court’s impervious approach to black interests.  The in-
terest-convergence thesis, then, imposes a special duty upon Professor Bell 
to grapple with doctrinal shifts in areas that he has criticized under the in-
terest-convergence theory and that have subsequently been altered.  All too 
often, however, the interest-convergence theory’s analysis is jettisoned 
when confronted with judicial decisions that suggest racial progress.195   
In the law-of-democracy field, for instance, Professor Bell allowed in 
Racial Remediation that, while the Court might invalidate egregious in-
stances of racial exclusion as it did in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,196 it would not 
address more subtle instances of racial discrimination “that dilute seriously 
[blacks’] political potential” because of the requirement for “prov[ing] that 
the lines or policies were intended to have a racially discriminatory ef-
fect.”197  When Professor Bell first lodged this assessment in 1976, it was 
difficult to quibble with its accuracy.  In the intervening years, however, 
approaches to minority political power have changed dramatically.  In re-
sponse to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mobile v. Bolden, which required 
that election schemes evince racially discriminatory “intent” in order to 
trigger constitutional or statutory protection,198 Congress clarified in 1982 
that plaintiffs could prevail upon a claim under section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act by examining “results” rather than intent.199  Subsequently, the 
Court gave real shape to that more robust protection of minority voting 
rights in Thornburgh v. Gingles, which established a manageable, three-part 
test for proving vote dilution.200 
Professor Bell has refrained from dedicating sustained attention to us-
ing the lens of interest-convergence to analyze how the Court, with prompt-
ing from the United States Senate, has substantially modified its approach 
for vindicating a minority vote dilution claim.  Instead, the 2004 edition of 
Race, Racism, and American Law mentions Gomillion and the subsequent 
equipopulous cases and then states: “[T]hese precedents have been far more 




195  Cf. Kennedy, supra note 18, at 1749 (contending that the scholarship of several prominent Criti-
cal Race Theorists, including Professor Bell, “reveal[s] significant deficiencies—the most general of 
which is a tendency to evade or suppress complications that render their conclusions problematic”). 
196  364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
197  Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 15–16.   
198  446 U.S. 55 (1980).   
199  See Frank R. Parker, The “Results” Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the 
Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715, 716 (1983). 
200  478 U.S. 30, 5051 (1986).   
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in ending those created or maintained to dilute the potential voting strength 
of blacks.”201  While Professor Bell does fleetingly acknowledge Gingles in 
his casebook,202 he does not analyze the case in the context of interest con-
vergence.  Whether the new vote-dilution regime actually advances black 
interests203 or whether the Court’s vote-dilution jurisprudence has been co-
opted by white suburbanites204 are conversations well worth having.  But it 
does not help to examine law and democracy with the interest-convergence 
lens when the theory leads to favorable results and to abandon that lens 
when arguably racially egalitarian judicial decisions muddy the analytical 
waters. 
Similarly, Professor Bell has offered criticism of the Court’s jurispru-
dence regarding the use of peremptory strikes in jury trials.  In Racial Re-
mediation, Professor Bell criticized the Court’s holding in Swain v. 
Alabama and its “refus[al] to condemn more sophisticated and no less ef-
fective means of barring blacks from juries, particularly in those cases 
where racial issues are important.”205  Swain surely presented a worthy tar-
get for criticism.  But Professor Bell has not explored how the interest-
convergence theory is undermined by the Court’s repudiation of Swain in 
Batson v. Kentucky, which introduced a burden-shifting mechanism for de-
termining whether peremptory strikes were exercised in a nondiscriminato-
ry fashion.206  That is not to suggest that Batson has proven to be a 
completely effective remedy for rooting out racially-motivated peremptory 
strikes; to the contrary, its flaws are legion.207  Indeed, I share the view of 
Justices Thurgood Marshall208 and Stephen G. Breyer,209 among others, who 
have suggested that abandoning peremptory strikes altogether may present 
the only viable method of ensuring that the strikes are not exercised in a 
discriminatory manner.  Despite its considerable shortcomings, however, 
one cannot doubt that Batson has provided at least some relief in instances 




201  BELL, RACE, RACISM, supra note 82, at 210. 
202  Id. at 509–10.   
203  See Guinier, supra note 96, at 1079–80 (expressing skepticism about whether the election of 
black officials necessarily advances black interests). 
204  See James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bol-
den: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1982). 
205  Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 15. 
206  476 U.S. 79 (1986).   
207  See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Blacks Still Being Blocked from Juries in the South, Study Finds, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 2, 2010, at A14. 
208  See Batson, 476 U.S. at 102–03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (contending that the only way 
to “end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process” is to “elimi-
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209  See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 268–69 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (advocating a re-
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why a Court that, according to the interest-convergence theory, generally 
evinces hostility to black interests would render such a decision.   
Professor Bell need not go so far as to concede that the doctrinal de-
velopments in Gingles and Batson irreparably damage the theory.  Many 
commentators, as suggested above, have leveled criticisms of those deci-
sions for providing insufficient relief to the problems that they purport to 
address.  Nonetheless, Professor Bell should explain how these decisions, 
which would seem to reflect the Court’s commitment to racial equality, are 
in fact merely further manifestations of the interest-convergence theory.  
Conversely, if these cases do in fact cut against the interest-convergence 
theory, Professor Bell should acknowledge that point frankly.  Ignoring or 
minimizing the significance of seemingly important doctrinal shifts regard-
ing race enhances the concern that the interest-convergence theory is less 
than fully committed to a candid assessment of developments in the legal 
world.     
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTEREST-CONVERGENCE THESIS 
The interest-convergence theory’s analytical flaws lead to several un-
desirable consequences in the arena of race relations.  The most obvious 
consequence of contending that racial progress has been modest since the 
days of slavery is that doing so invites black people to despair about the 
possibility of achieving racial equality.  Indeed, many scholars have criti-
cized the fatalistic feature of Professor Bell’s work.211  In response, Profes-
sor Bell and some of his admirers have attempted to defang the fatalism 
critique by contending that, even if black people cannot ultimately succeed 
in altering their subordinate condition in American society, there remains a 
certain nobility in the struggle.212  These efforts to deflect the critique of 
despair, however, seem highly unpersuasive.  If efforts to throw off the 
yoke of racial oppression are truly futile, many black people can be ex-
pected to abandon efforts to win equality for the race, even if they do not 
forsake individual advancement.213    
                                                                                                                 
210  See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (reversing the Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
determination that no Batson violation occurred where the prosecutor’s explanation for peremptorily 
striking a black juror also would have required him to strike white jurors); Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 237 
(finding a Batson violation where a prosecutor struck ten out of eleven black jurors from the venire). 
211  See, e.g., john a. powell, Racial Realism or Racial Despair?, 24 CONN. L. REV. 533, 550 (1992) 
(observing that Professor Bell’s analysis is “unsuccessful in avoiding despair”). 
212  See, e.g., BELL, FACES, supra note 87, at 10; Tracy E. Higgins, Derrick Bell’s Radical Realism, 
61 FORDHAM L. REV. 683, 692 (1992) (reviewing BELL, FACES, supra note 87) (“Bell’s description of 
racism as a permanent condition is calculated to lead not to despair but, perhaps ironically, to freedom—
the freedom from false hope in the unrealized and perhaps unrealizable promise of racial justice.”).  
213  See George W. Dent, Jr., Race, Trust, Altruism, and Reciprocity, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1001, 
1026 (2005) (“Expressions of despair like Professor Bell’s become self-fulfilling prophecies.  One who 
despairs does not bother to strive for racial progress.” (footnote omitted)).   
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Rather than rehashing the despair critique, this Part will concentrate on 
two underappreciated consequences that flow from the interest-convergence 
thesis.  First, the interest-convergence theory’s conception of the conditions 
that are necessary to bring about change invites would-be racial reformers 
to adopt artificially constrained notions of what constitutes a viable method 
for seeking change.  Second, the irrefutability of the interest-convergence 
theory lends itself to a racially conspiratorial viewpoint that hinders black 
advancement.   
A. Constrained Racial Remedies  
Proponents of the interest-convergence theory have long been con-
cerned with its implications for advancing the cause of racial equality.  In-
deed, Professor Bell has suggested that the theory provides a 
comprehensive map of the path leading to racial progress.  “Further 
progress to fulfill the mandate of Brown is possible to the extent that the di-
vergence of racial interests can be avoided or minimized,” Professor Bell 
has written.214  Erasing any doubt as to whether he regards interest-
convergence as the sole method of achieving racial progress, Professor Bell 
explained that “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be 
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.”215  
Many other scholars have also suggested that the interest-convergence 
theory demonstrates how minorities—racial and otherwise—will be able to 
win advancement.216  But the assertion that black people receive favorable 
judicial decisions only when their interests converge with those of whites 
invites proponents of racial equality to limit the menu of possible remedial 
strategies for seeking black advancement.  While appealing to interest-
convergence impulses may present one powerful weapon for seeking racial 




214  Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 528.   
215  Id. at 523 (emphasis added). 
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A leading consequence of subscribing to the interest-convergence 
theory as the only (or even the predominant) method of achieving reform is 
its inculcation of passivity in its adherents.  This consequence is, of course, 
a logical outgrowth of the lack of agency that the interest-convergence 
theory accords black people.  Waiting for moments of “racial fortuity” to 
present themselves is, in many ways, not all that distinct an endeavor from 
waiting for lightning to strikeor, perhaps more appositely still, waiting 
for the stars to align.  Indeed, it is no accident that at least one interest-
convergence proponent has suggested precisely this astronomical metaphor 
in seeking change in the animal rights context.217  Passivity, though, seldom 
if ever lends itself to creating the conditions that are necessary to bring 
about successful challenges to racial hierarchy.       
Concentrating on interest convergence as the predominant method of 
achieving racial equality often allocates insufficient space to other methods 
of attempting to bring about racial change.  By consistently attempting to 
frame political and legal disputes in a manner that endeavors to explain why 
white people stand to benefit from adopting a particular posture, advocates 
of racial reform risk undervaluing the role that morality and honor play in 
shaping political and legal debates.  And the moral considerations of many 
whites, contrary to Professor Bell’s view,218 have played an important role 
in black advancement throughout American history.   
Moreover, it can sometimes be very difficult, if not impossible, to ex-
plain why a particular decision will benefit white interests—at least in the 
narrow sense of that term.219  The inability to frame an argument using the 
language of white and black interest convergence should not discourage 
black people from seeking governmental relief.  This statement is particu-
larly apt in the judicial realm, where the pull of interest convergence may be 
minimal, at least in comparison to the political realm.  Black people will 
never know what governmental relief is possible if they limit the instances 
in which they seek relief to instances where they can appeal to a narrowly 
conceived notion of white self-interest.   
The focus on interest convergence, to the virtual exclusion of other 
strategies for racial advancement, motivates some legal commentators to 
propose remedial ideas that are of dubious value.  Two separate law review 
articles, for instance, have contended that the United States’ war on terror-
ism presents the optimal conditions for racial minorities to advance interest-
convergence arguments.220  Professor Eric Yamamoto, in making a case for 




217  See Lubinski, supra note 31, at 412 (“The [interest-convergence] theory . . . provides animal ad-
vocates with the rhetoric required for a successful campaign and the precedent to persist—eventually the 
stars will align and breakthroughs will ensue.”). 
218  See Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 525. 
219  See supra text accompanying notes 11113.  
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tered moral authority and international standing to sustain a preemptive 
worldwide war on terror unless it fully and fairly redresses the continuing 
harms of its own historic government-sponsored terrorizing of a significant 
segment of its populace.”221 
If taken seriously, however, this scheme of attempting to capitalize 
upon a national tragedy would run a serious risk of retarding the cause of 
racial equality.  If black people had begun pressing reparations claims with 
increased intensity on September 12, 2001, those assertions may have un-
derscored the belief that black people are not, in some fundamental sense, 
truly Americans.222  Reinforcing the notion that blacks are, at most, quasi-
Americans would certainly delay the day that blacks achieve genuine racial 
equality.  On a practical level, moreover, this adaptation of the interest-
convergence theory would have little chance of actually succeeding.  For 
one thing, many blacks view themselves as intensely patriotic and would 
have little stomach for attempting to divert attention away from capturing 
the nation’s avowed enemies.  For another, few government officials seem 
likely to view the connection between Osama bin Laden’s brand of terror-
ism and Jim Crow’s brand of terrorism as sufficiently strong so as to require 
political or judicial action.    
One legal commentator has advanced a similarly flawed potential ap-
plication of the interest-convergence theory in the context of achieving 
school financing reform.223  Because black students disproportionately at-
tend inner-city schools, Professor David Singleton has argued, the interest-
convergence theory dictates that suburban school districts will not be con-
vinced to share their economic wealth with urban school districts unless it 
can be demonstrated that doing so would advance the interests of the subur-
ban school districts.224  Among the other strategies for demonstrating how 
interdistrict sharing would serve white interests, Professor Singleton con-
templates emphasizing that underfunded inner-city schools produce poorly 
educated black males who in turn commit crimes—sometimes against white 




221  Yamamoto et al., supra note 34, at 1329. 
222  Professor Bell contends that many people incorrectly view blacks as not truly American.  See 
BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 195 (“Beyond the ebb and flow of racial progress lies the 
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commodated unless it converges with the interests of whites.  Therefore, given the highly charged poli-
tics surrounding interdistrict desegregation remedies, economic integration of Greater Cincinnati schools 
will not occur unless white, suburban school districts are persuaded that such integration serves their 
interests.”).   
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roughly to instructing white citizens: “Give black people your tax dollars or 
else you will get robbed by a young, undereducated black man.”  As even 
Professor Singleton seems to recognize, however, heightening notions of 
black criminality presents a reform strategy that may well contain consider-
able drawbacks.226   
These efforts to shoehorn remedial policies regarding black reparations 
and school financing into the interest-convergence paradigm illustrate how 
the theory occupies an inordinately large place in the imagination of racial 
reformers.  Not every cause lends itself to being framed in a manner that 
appeals to the interest-convergence impulse.  Indeed, framing arguments in 
terms of interest convergence sometimes risks stalling progress toward ra-
cial equality, as the constant search for moments of interest convergence 
can cause advocates to overlook more promising avenues of achieving ra-
cial reform.  Worse, the fixation on interest convergence could affirmatively 
retard racial progress by portraying blacks as quasi-Americans or accentuat-
ing the criminality of black males.  None of this is to contend, of course, 
that proponents of racial equality should altogether abandon the interest-
convergence strategy.  Highlighting the ways in which society as a whole 
stands to benefit from black advancement can sometimes form the basis of 
a powerful argument in the judicial or the political realm.227  Focusing on 
the interest-convergence theory to the exclusion of all other strategies, how-
ever, unnecessarily closes off many promising avenues for racial reform.   
B. Racial Conspiracy Theory   
The inability to refute the suggestion that the interest-convergence 
theory is at work results in the reinforcement of racially conspiratorial 
thought, a mindset that is disturbingly prominent within the black commu-
nity.228  Although conspiracy theories often flourish among the most mar-
                                                                                                                 
link between black males’ low graduation rates and increasing crime rates persuade white suburbanites 
to tolerate, if not embrace, interdistrict economic integration?”). 
226  Id. at 675 (“Emphasizing this link . . . reinforces the stereotype of young black men as dangerous 
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at 1 (detailing myriad tales of racial conspiracy surrounding fried chicken: “that KFC founder Col. Har-
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ginalized and disaffected members of society,229 large segments of even the 
most upwardly mobile black citizens appear to subscribe to racially conspir-
atorial ideas.  One study that polled the attitudes toward racial conspiracy 
among college students found that 60.2% of black respondents thought that 
it was definitely true or possibly true that the AIDS virus was intentionally 
designed in a laboratory to infect blacks.230  Even more staggeringly, fully 
84.1% of the black college students deemed it definitely true or possibly 
true that the United States government intentionally ensures that illicit 
drugs are available in impoverished black communities.231  The belief that 
American society has systematically oppressed black people is, of course, 
far from a figment of the black imagination, as this nation’s sordid racial 
past teems with examples of precisely such treatment.232  Nevertheless, in 
the modern era, no evidence confirms that large-scale racial conspiracies 
exist within the United States.   
The relentless search to identify widespread racial conspiracies exacts 
serious costs on many black citizens.  Not the least of these costs is that 
when one constantly searches for racial conspiracies, they can often be 
found—even when they do not exist.  While it is certainly true that just be-
cause you are paranoid does not mean that they are not out to get you,233 
many individuals would do well to remember that the converse applies with 
at least equal force: espousing racially paranoid rhetoric does not mean that 
you have in fact uncovered a conspiracy to oppress black people.  As politi-
cal science Professor Edward Banfield wrote four decades ago, “It is bad 
enough to suffer real prejudice . . . without having to suffer imaginary pre-
                                                                                                                 
land Sanders stole his recipe from a black domestic worker, that Church’s Fried Chicken contained an 
ingredient manufactured by the KKK to sterilize black males, that the founder of Popeye’s fried chicken 
made a major contribution to the Senate campaign of former KKK Grand Dragon David Duke.”). 
229  See Michiko Kakutani, It’s a Plot!, No, It’s Not: A Debunking, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2010, at 
C1; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE 108, 113 
(2009) (dismissing the idea that subscribing to conspiracies is evidence of “individual pathology” and 
that “[f]or purposes of understanding the spread of conspiracy theories, it is especially important to note 
that group polarization is particularly likely, and particularly pronounced, when people have a shared 
sense of identity and are connected by bonds of solidarity”).   
230  See Jennifer Crocker et al., Belief in U.S. Government Conspiracies Against Blacks Among 
Black and White College Students: Powerlessness or System Blame?, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 941, 946 (1999).  Just 9.5% of white respondents agreed with that assessment.  Id. 
231  Id.  Just 4.2% of white respondents agreed with that assessment.  Id. 
232  Here, I have in mind the United States Constitution’s accommodation of slavery as a prime ex-
ample of systemic racial oppression.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, superseded by U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  In more recent years, 
the government targeted only black men to examine the effects of syphilis in the notorious Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study.  See Susan M. Reverby, “Special Treatment”: BiDil, Tuskegee, and the Logic of Race, 
36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 478, 480 (2008). 
233  This expression has been attributed to many people over the years.  One such person is Huey P. 
Newton.  See Delgado, supra note 22, at 59.  
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judice as well.”234  A related cost of the racially conspiratorial viewpoint is 
that the search prevents at least some black people from seeking interracial 
understanding and relationships, as white people are warily viewed as po-
tential conspirators in racial oppression.235  A final cost of ubiquitously per-
ceived (and asserted) racial conspiracies stems from the risk that such 
claims become part of the nation’s permanent background noise, preventing 
advocates for racial equality from gaining sorely needed attention to address 
policies and laws that have a disproportionately negative impact on black 
lives.236    
Notably, the interest-convergence thesis accounts for the existence of 
“racial paranoia,” but it acknowledges the phenomenon as existing only 
among white people.237  Professor Bell, as early as 1979, contended that the 
idea underlying the interest-convergence theory means that white opponents 
of policies or decisions that would seem to benefit blacks evince a brand of 
racial paranoia.238  If blacks receive seemingly favorable decisions only 
when white interests are advanced (or at least not harmed), the theory runs, 
then clear-thinking white people should understand that they always gain 
more from what are ostensibly black victories.  As Professor Bell has writ-
ten, “One would imagine that only a perverse form of racial paranoia can 
explain white opposition to racial remedies that, history teaches us, benefit 
whites more than blacks.”239   
In his recent elaboration upon this “perverse form of racial para-
noia,”240 Professor Bell addresses white opposition to affirmative action in a 
way that is designed to critique racially conspiratorial thinking but in fact 
succeeds principally in exposing his own racially conspiratorial thought.241  




234  EDWARD C. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF OUR URBAN 
CRISIS 87 (1970).   
235  I do not mean to suggest that certain members of the black race are the only people capable of 
falling into racially conspiratorial viewpoints.  Whites may be no more immune to baseless, racially 
conspiratorial viewpoints than blacks.  See, e.g., Peter Beinart, Erasing the Race Factor, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 13, 2008, at A15 (suggesting that Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama should adopt 
policy positions to mitigate the concern that an Obama administration would be dedicated to assisting 
primarily African-Americans).  
236  Cf. FORD, supra note 124, at 19 (suggesting that unwarranted accusations of racial discrimina-
tion invite the dangers of crying “wolf”).  It is important to note that policies that disproportionately im-
pact blacks are distinct from conspiracies.    
237  Bell, Bakke, supra note 84, at 14.  
238  Id. 
239  Id.  
240  BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 141.   
241  See id.  Professor Bell also views white opposition to Brown as evincing a “perverse form of ra-
cial paranoia”: “[T]he generation-long struggle over school desegregation sparked by the Brown deci-
sion has brought far more attention to the plight of the public schools—and far more money and 
resources to improve their quality—than would ever have occurred had blacks not made the effort to 
achieve an ‘equal educational opportunity.’  Today, public schools are improved, but remain mainly se-
gregated and unequal.”  Bell, Bakke, supra note 84, at 14–15. 
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tion policies because doing so would advance their economic interests.242  
“White women have been the major beneficiaries of affirmative action,” 
Professor Bell contends.243  “And to the extent that affirmative action rules 
often require advertising jobs rather than simply filling them via existing 
‘old-boy’ networks, white men have had access to positions they would 
have never learned of without the policies so many of them abhor.”244   
This analysis is confounding.  White men are, of course, the prototypi-
cal beneficiaries of the old-boy network, in which occupational positions 
are filled through back channels rather than formal applications.  Thus, it is 
difficult to understand how white men would benefit from a system that de-
creases the importance of social capital.245  It is quite possible, of course, 
that the advertising requirement would result in no meaningful change 
whatsoever.  Merely learning about the existence of a position is no guaran-
tee of landing a position, as advertising the job may in fact constitute a mere 
formality, with the actual hiring decision occurring in much the way of the 
old-boy network.246  This strained effort to identify appreciable benefits for 
white men as a result of affirmative action, rather than to be content identi-
fying even static racial conditions, reveals the conspiratorial nature of the 
interest-convergence ideology.     
Like many conspiracy theories, a key feature of the interest-
convergence theory views the search for racial conspiracies as being essen-
tial precisely because they are difficult to detect.247  Perhaps the clearest 
manifestation of the belief that conspiracies are often subtle comes in the 
epigraph to Professor Bell’s 2004 book, Silent Covenants:   
The world is moved by diverse powers and pressures creating cross currents 
that unpredictably, yet with eerie precision, determine the outcome of events.  
Often invisible in their influence, these forces shape our destinies, furthering 




242  See BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 141. 
243  Id. 
244  Id.  
245  See, e.g., Glenn C. Loury, A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences, in WOMEN, 
MINORITIES AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 153, 176 (Phyllis A. Wallace & Annette M. LaMond 
eds., 1977) (contending that one’s informal social network shapes not only what knowledge one can 
access but also whether one can harness that knowledge in a productive manner).  This analysis could 
intend to suggest that a different (i.e., less well-connected) variety of white man would benefit from a 
more transparent hiring system, but Professor Bell should spell out precisely how white men stand to 
benefit. 
246  See, e.g., Kenneth L. Shropshire, Minority Issues in Contemporary Sports, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 189, 206 (2004).     
247  See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT 
ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 134–35 (1997) (criticizing radical legal scholarship broadly for the nega-
tive effects of emphasizing the subtlety that is supposedly required to unmask conspiracy). 
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elusive precisely because we are caught up in the myriad of manifestations of 
perfection itself.248   
In a tribute to Professor Bell’s work, Professor Richard Delgado has also 
emphasized the subterranean aspect of racism: “American society oppresses 
and subordinates minorities of color at every turn, subscribing to a nearly 
invisible ideology that finds [racial] oppression tolerable, natural, and in-
evitable.”249   
The interest-convergence theory’s conspiratorial view envelops itself 
in the notion that only the theory’s adherents have the courage to see and 
acknowledge how racial considerations actually operate in the real world.250  
Professor Bell has written that the outlook “is simply a hard-eyed view of 
racism as it is and [blacks’] subordinate role in [society].”251  Individuals 
who disagree with the interest-convergence theory’s conclusions are dis-
missed as being uninformed and naïve.  For example, Professor Bell has re-
cently explained that commentators who believe that “Brown was and is a 
valuable precedent” are “entitled to their viewsbut they fit quite nicely 
with those who hold that the earth is, after all, flat.”252   
The conspiratorial viewpoint is so thoroughly incorporated into the in-
terest-convergence theory that it even serves to explain why people express 
skepticism of the theory’s explanatory power.  The completely self-
reinforcing nature of the interest-convergence thesis is captured by Profes-
sor Delgado’s fictional protagonist, Rodrigo Crenshaw.  “As you’ll see,” 
Professor Crenshaw explains, “interest-convergence explains resistance to 
the very idea of interest-convergence.”253  This sentence encapsulates how 
the interest-convergence theory offers a truly unified theory of law and race.  
Indeed, some interest-convergence adherents even go so far as to detect 
conspiracies in the reception to Professor Bell’s scholarship.254   
  The conspiratorial manner in which the interest-convergence theory is 
propounded, thus, has the undesirable appearance of seeking to silence dis-
senting viewpoints.  The theory’s derision of potential objections either as 




248  BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 10, at epigraph. 
249  Delgado, Will We Ever Be Saved?, supra note 175, at 926. 
250  Professor Bartlett has identified a similar phenomenon among some feminists.  See Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist Legal Thought, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 
303, 323–24.   
251  Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 85, at 378. 
252  Bell, Unintended Lessons, supra note 49, at 1054. 
253  Delgado, supra note 22, at 48 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
254  See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Racial Double Helix: Watson, Crick, and Brown v. 
Board of Education (Our No-Bell Prize Award Speech), 47 HOW. L.J. 473, 478 (2004) (“No, [Professor 
Bell] will never win a Nobel Prize, you can bank on it, and probably not a MacArthur ‘genius’ grant, 
either.  Instead, glory, laud, and honor go to legal figures who obscure how power works, how law oper-
ates so that the haves always come out ahead, and how our system, even of race-remedies law, subju-
gates its supposed beneficiaries.”). 
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does not exactly lend itself to probing scholarly exchange.  Nevertheless, 
rejecting the interest-convergence theory’s efforts to stifle intellectual ex-
change is nothing less than imperative.     
CONCLUSION 
The article that coined the term “interest convergence” ended with the 
suggestion that “awareness” is “always the first step toward overcoming 
still another barrier in the struggle for racial equality.”255  Although the pre-
ceding pages have offered many theoretical criticisms of the interest-
convergence thesis, this Article heartily endorses that conclusion.  Indeed, 
this Article has been animated by the proposition that advocates of racial 
equality, who demonstrate intimate familiarity with the theory’s virtues, 
would benefit from an increased awareness of the theory’s vulnerabilities.   
Beyond the racial context, moreover, my broader hope is that legal 
scholars and other individuals who have incorporated the insights of interest 
convergence wholesale into various legal and political arenas will critically 
examine both the theory and its applications.  The interest-convergence 
theory can offer valuable and formidable insights into the way that change 
occurs; it should not, however, be viewed as either flawless or all-
encompassing.256  Instead of adhering to any unified theory, reformers seek-
ing change would do better to think of the interest-convergence thesis as but 
one weapon in the fight for progress rather than as the entire arsenal.  Ad-
vocates for change, moreover, should be particularly circumspect of at-
tempting to implement the interest-convergence strategy when doing so 
may further the very inequalities that they seek to erase.  Initiating this con-
versation about the frailties of interest convergence, then, may well help to 
advance the nation’s continuing struggle for equalitynot only regarding 














255  Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 533.   
256  Cf. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 112, at 5 (“Public choice can at least provide us with some 
overall concept of the dynamics of democratic government.  So long as we remember that the theory is 
incomplete, it can provide a useful framework for analysis.  The danger lies only in confusing the map 
with the territory.”). 
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